Call for Applications for Internship Programme

As part of its Investigative Reporting Initiative programme, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network is looking for five journalism students who wish to learn from dedicated journalists and editors in a course of three months.

The programme will provide the successful candidates with a key theoretical foundation, followed by systematic but very practical investigative work. The selected candidates will receive online training from experienced journalists at the beginning of the programme and
spend the rest of the internship working on investigative stories, while receiving support to understand and learn about the most relevant procedures.

BIRN is offering the five placements to applicants from six Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. You will work from home or from your newsroom, as the programme is due to take place online.

Who can apply?

Journalism students from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia.

How to apply?

Applicants should submit the following documents to ivana.nikolic@birnnetwork.org in English before September 21, at midnight Central European Time:


● Applicant’s CV (in English)
● Motivation letter (in English)

● Work sample (translated into English; school assignments are eligible)
● Evidence of status (in English or local language)

The motivation letter should show how you expect to benefit from the programme and your motivation to participate.

Applicants that do not have any published work can submit their student assignments from practical courses in journalism.

Applicants should provide evidence of their current situation. This evidence should include, but not be limited to, confirmation of enrolment at university.

Language:

All applications must be submitted in English; proof of status may be in local languages. The programme’s working language will be English, so advanced knowledge of the English language is required.


DURATION OF INTERNSHIP: October 1, 2022 to December 23, 2022.
DEADLINE: September 21, 2022, at midnight Central European Time

Data Dominance: In Cyprus, a Chinese Outpost inside the EU

In October 2015, two years after a banking crisis left Cyprus in desperate need of new financing, President Nicos Anastasiades visited China on a charm offensive, touting the Mediterranean island’s low tax rates, its European Union membership and its readiness to take part in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, BRI.

The floodgates opened, but there was nothing sporadic about the Chinese outlay.

Today, money from Chinese state-owned or state-linked corporations has penetrated the core of just about every key Cypriot sector, from real estate to natural resources, transport to aviation, all in the name of a transcontinental infrastructure project linking countries along the route of the old Silk Road.

Thanks in part to the BRI, China is set to surpass the United States as the world’s leading economy by 2028 and become the standout superpower heading into the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution.’

A key component of the BRI is the Digital Silk Road, DSR, through which the Chinese Communist Party seeks to develop and export key technological infrastructure – including 5G – to participating states, boosting the importance and presence of Chinese tech companies around the world and, to a degree, replicating its digital authoritarian model.


Chinese investments in Cyprus. Illustration: BIRN/Igor Vujcic

In Cyprus, according to BIRN’s findings, China now dominates the 5G networks and the island’s wider tech ecosystem, creating a key Chinese outpost inside the EU with potentially far-reaching consequences for data security and the independence of Cypriot – and by extension EU – foreign policy.

It is a state of affairs that contradicts US and EU recommendations and the island’s own claims to be pursuing a multi-vendor strategy.

5G underpins power grids, transportation and water supplies, and, in the future, will enable military tools including artificial intelligence, said Carisa Nietsche, associate fellow for the Transatlantic Security Program at the Washington-based Centre for a New American Security.

“In extreme cases, analysts suspect China could pull the plug on the network, gather intelligence from data pulsing through the networks or cut off a 5G-enabled energy grid,” Nietsche told BIRN.

Chinese investment in Cyprus

In 2015, China’s largest private copper smelter, Yanggu Xiangguang Copper, bought a 22 per cent stake in Cyprus-registered copper mining company Atalaya Mining Plc for 96.2 million euros.

In November 2019, a consortium led by state-owned China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering signed a 290 million-euro deal with the Cypriot natural gas infrastructure company ETYFA to build a liquefied natural gas terminal for electricity generation. Among the four firms in the consortium is state-owned Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding, the top warship producer for the Chinese navy.

Before it pulled out in 2019, state-owned Aviation Industry Corp. of China, AVIC, was the largest shareholder in Cypriot airline Cobalt.

JimChang Global Group has invested 100 million euros in a five-star hotel and housing development near Ayia Napa via a joint venture announced in 2016 with Cyprus property group Giovani. The residential part was completed last year.

Macau-based Melco is investing $677 million in the City of Dreams Mediterranean, an ‘integrated casino resort’ in Limassol, Cyprus. It is expected to open in 2022.

Building 5G on Chinese foundations

Illustration: BIRN/Igor Vujcic

On his 2015 visit to China, Anastasiades, who was re-elected in 2018, visited the Shanghai research centre of Huawei, the world’s largest manufacturer of telecommunications equipment.

Huawei plays a key role in driving global industry standards in Beijing’s favour through the filing of patents that make the industry more likely to adopt Chinese proposals as global standards.

In terms of 5G standard essential patents, Huawei has the largest portfolio worldwide. The company claims to hold more commercial 5G contracts than any other telecom manufacturer in the world – 91. Forty-seven of these are in Europe.

At the research centre, Anastasiades lauded Huawei’s “important contributions to communications network construction in Cyprus” and called for “deeper ties”.

Huawei’s dominance, however, has unsettled the United States and others, which say the company’s equipment could be used by Beijing for spying, something Huawei has vigorously disputed.

In a rare interview with foreign media in 2019, Huawei founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei said: “I love my country. I support the Communist Party. But I will not do anything to harm the world.” He said that Beijing had never asked him or Huawei to share “improper information” about its partners and that he would “never harm the interest” of his customers.

Unconvinced, in October 2020 then US undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy and the environment, Keith Krach, visited Nicosia and, with the 5G licence application process underway in Cyprus, incorporated the island into the US ‘Clean Network’ on 5G, an initiative launched under former President Donald Trump to build a global alliance excluding technology that Washington says can be manipulated by the Chinese Communist Party.

The Americans are concerned, in part, by the proximity of Chinese-dominated 5G networks to military bases. But while on paper the Cypriots may have sided with the Americans, in practice Huawei is still very much in play.

Huawei (Nicosia)-the building in which Huawei’s main Cyprus offices reside. Photo: BIRN

The company entered the local market in 2009, taking a lead role in the upgrade of the island’s information and communications technology and the 2/3/4G infrastructure of its four telecommunications companies, CyTA, Epic, Cablenet and Primetel.

Since Cyprus uses the so-called Non-Standalone, or NSA, mode for 5G – effectively building on top of its existing 4G infrastructure – and with Huawei providing the components for 100 per cent of the telecom companies’ 4G Radio Access Network, RAN – the Chinese giant looked perfectly placed last year to take the lead in the 5G rollout as well.

The RAN is comprised of various facilities such as cell towers and masts that connect users and devices to the Core Network, which in turn encompasses all 5G data exchanges such as authentication, security, session management and traffic aggregation across devices.

In December 2020, the two biggest 5G contracts were awarded to CyTA and Epic.

But both companies, sources say, are overwhelmingly dependent on Huawei for their Core Network and their RAN infrastructure.

Semi-governmental CyTA launched its 5G Network in January 2021, catering to 70 per cent of the population on launch and aiming for 98 per cent coverage by the start of 2022.

A senior CyTA manager told BIRN that 80 per cent of the company’s Core Network and 100 per cent of its RAN is covered by Huawei infrastructure. The remaining 20 per cent of its Core Network is provided by Swedish Ericsson.

“CyTA is a governmental company and comes up with tenders for the equipment, and Huawei has been a long-term provider of infrastructure and support and offers the best prices,” said the senior manager, who asked not to be named since he was not authorised to speak to media.

Asked about the makeup of its Core Network and RAN infrastructure, CyTA told BIRN: “We inform you that any information regarding the CyTA network is a trade secret and any disclosure of it is contrary to the commercial interests of CyTA and its partners (article 34 (2) Law 184 (I) / 2017).”

Huawei also accounts for 90 per cent of Epic’s Core Network infrastructure and 100 per cent of the RAN, said a senior manager at Epic, who also spoke on condition of anonymity.

Epic’s collaboration with Huawei dates to 2009, when the company, then named MTN, sealed a 20 million-euro contract with the Chinese firm to upgrade its network.

Now owned by Monaco Telecom, Epic went on to develop Cyprus’s first 4G LTE network, leveraging Huawei’s RAN solution, on which another Cypriot telecommunications firm, Primetel, also entered into an access-sharing agreement. In February 2019, shortly before its rebranding as Epic, MTN signed a deal with Huawei for the development of its 5G network.

An Epic spokesperson did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

Nietsche, of the Centre for a New American Security, told BIRN: “For 5G to deliver on its promises of faster speeds, it requires an immense amount of data to travel through the network. And that data is pushed closer and closer to the end user, or the edge of the network.”

“In Europe, some governments have distinguished between implementation of Huawei in the Core Network and the Radio Access Network, or edge of the network. These governments argue that you can essentially create a firewall between the core and edge of the network.”

“However, we should not make such a distinction. As 5G networks develop, more and more data is pushed toward the edge of the network, and it becomes harder to distinguish between the core and edge of the network.”

Chinese ‘fusion’


Huawei section of the Gulf Information Technology Exhibition (GITEX) Global 2021. Photo: EPA-EFE/ALI HAIDER

Using Huawei components within 5G infrastructure is not a direct violation of European Union guidelines, since the EU toolbox on 5G – a common set of guidelines laid out by the bloc to limit 5G cybersecurity risks – did not explicitly ban any specific company but left it to member states to decide which providers were ‘high-risk’.

Authorities in Cyprus have not as yet identified any provider as ‘high-risk’.

The October 2020 memorandum of understanding that saw Cyprus sign up to the US Clean Network “does not imply in an implicit or explicit way that Cyprus will move away from Huawei”, said the man who signed it, Deputy Minister for Research, Innovation and Digital Policy Kyriacos Kokkinos.

“What it says is that we will collaborate with US agencies and authorities so that we ensure that the security standards are respected in the infrastructure we deploy,” Kokkinos told BIRN.

EU guidelines, however, do stress caution over suppliers “subject to interference from a non-EU country”, warning that a member state’s network could be vulnerable if there was a “strong link between the supplier and a government of a third country.”

Huawei’s state ties are considerable.

Zhengfei, the company’s founder, was a former Deputy Regimental Chief of the People’s Liberation Army; reports say that a considerable number of Huawei employees are believed to have worked for the military; and some Huawei employees have collaborated on research projects with military personnel.

But it was legislation passed in China in 2017 that really raised eyebrows.

Article 7 of China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law requires any organisation to support, provide assistance and cooperate in “national intelligence work”. Even before that, Article 22 of the 2014 Counter-Espionage Law required any “relevant organisations and individuals” to “truthfully provide” information during any “counter-espionage investigation”.

China’s “military-civil fusion” – which calls for private sector assistance in the country’s military objectives – was inscribed as a strategic priority in the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution in October 2017.

Some European countries have already balked.

In October, Swedish telecom regulator PTS banned Huawei from supplying 5G equipment to Swedish mobile firms due to security concerns raised by Sweden’s SAP security service, a decision upheld by a Swedish court in June this year.

Huawei has repeatedly denied posing a security threat, while China threatened “all necessary measures” in response to the Swedish ban. Beijing also told France and Germany not to “discriminate” against the company.

In the United Kingdom, a firm US ally, the government set a cap of 35 per cent limit on Huawei’s involvement in 5G RAN. It also excluded Huawei from safety-related and safety critical networks and sensitive locations such as nuclear sites and military bases.

In Cyprus, Kokkinos would not be drawn on whether Cyprus might set a similar cap.

“I don’t want to make a statement that might be misleading that this is not something that might happen in the future,” he said. “But at the moment we do not exclude any vendor.”

Critics of the Chinese government say the stakes could not be higher.

Given how much states and societies will come to depend on fifth generation technology, its security poses an unprecedented challenge, with any potential ‘hack’ snowballing into a threat to national security.

As a host to British military bases and US spy stations at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, Cyprus is no ‘island’ when it comes to geostrategic importance. Some experts say the threat posed by Huawei’s political and military ties and its data dominance in Cyprus cannot be ignored.

“One day Cyprus has to choose a side,” said Chen Yonglin, a former Chinese consular official in Sydney, Australia, whose work included monitoring Chinese dissidents until he defected in 2005. “One day China will take off its mask and Cyprus won’t be able to stand in the middle.”

“Cyprus needs to be careful about handing over its sovereignty to China,” he told BIRN.

John Strand, director and founder of telecommunications consultancy firm Strand Consult, concurred:

“The China we have today is a different China than we had five years ago,” he said. “China is a country which is very aggressive to countries which basically have an opinion, or have citizens who have an opinion about what is going on in China, Hong Kong or Tibet, and other places.”

“We have seen that China is not only threatening countries which go against them or criticise them, they also punish countries,” he told BIRN.

“If the Internet broke down 10 to 15 years ago, society could move on, it was not an issue. Nowadays, everything in our society is built on top of IT solutions which are connected to each other through the Internet of Things.

Cyprus embraces Chinese blockchain

Huawei, however, is not the only cause of potential concern when it comes to Cyprus.

Another is VeChain, a Chinese state-backed blockchain platform that in November 2018 entered into a national partnership with Cyprus to assist the island in the development and implementation of blockchain solutions across a range of private and public sectors.

Mediterranean Hospital of Cyprus (Limassol),one of two Cypriot hospitals to partner with VeChain store vaccination records on the VeChainThor blockchain. Photo: BIRN

It is the only such state partnership VeChain has outside of China.

The platform, launched in 2015, is a favourite of the Chinese Communist Party, which has entrusted it with contracts in, among other areas, agriculture and telecoms.

In July 2018, after thousands of children were given faulty vaccines, the Chinese government called on VeChain to create a nationwide vaccine tracking solution with health data stored on the blockchain.

When VeChain presented its solution at the China International Import Expo in November 2018, President Xi Jinping was in attendance. Xi has declared blockchain a national priority, with VeChain a co-founder of the Belt and Road Initiative Blockchain Alliance that aims to develop blockchain along the route of the BRI.

In Cyprus, VeChain developed the E-HCert App, which records COVID-19 PCR and antibody test results on the VeChain Thor Blockchain and is being expanded to serve as a wallet for all medical records of Cypriot citizens and as a vaccination certificate.

The ‘V-Pass’, a vaccination certificate sealed in the VeChain Thor, is also in the pipeline for the general public.

Two of the island’s biggest private hospitals have also struck agreements with VeChain for it to host their medical records on its blockchain.

Christiana Aristidou, co-founder and vice-chair of the Cyprus Blockchain Association, said that all necessary measures had been put in place “to maintain the safety of health data.”

“Blockchain is very secure and VeChain intends to take the lead in this sector in Cyprus,” Aristidou told BIRN.

Asked about any risks to data security, the Cypriot Health Ministry replied: “The Ministry of Health does not use blockchain technology in public hospitals.”

Golden passports and a city of dreams

But while some experts voice deep concern over the extent of China’s data presence in Cyprus, domestic scrutiny appears lacking. One reason may by the stakes involved for a number of influential political and legal figures.

In August 2020, an undercover report by Al Jazeera exposed a scam at the heart of a Cypriot policy to provide citizenship to foreign nationals who invest two million euros in the island’s economy.

According to the report, a number of high-level Cypriot officials had abused the scheme to secure passports for several thousand foreigners who did not meet the legal requirements.

Passport control at the derelict former Nicosia International Airport in Nicosia, Cyprus. Photo: EPA/JAN RAKOCZY

An official investigation, published in June this year, said that 97 per cent of the 6,546 ‘golden’ passports issued between 2007 and August 2020 had been issued since Anastasiades took power in 2013.

More than half, or 3,609, were for family members of investors and executives of companies and who were granted citizenship without actually meeting the legal criteria.

Between 2017 and 2019, the Al Jazeera report found that 482 wealthy Chinese nationals applied for passports via the scheme, more than any other nationality bar Russian. They include several members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, an advisory body to the Communist Party.

The chief protagonist in the Al Jazeera exposé was Dimitris Syllouris, who as speaker of the parliament at the time was the country’s second highest-ranking official after the president.

Syllouris was caught helping to fast-track a Cypriot passport for a fictitious Chinese businessman despite being told the applicant had a criminal record and was therefore barred from a ‘golden’ passport under the rules of the scheme.

Syllouris, who resigned over the scandal, had been a key player in a number of deals between Nicosia and Beijing, including in the tech sector.

Property developer and MP Christakis Giovanis, whose company partnered in 2016 with Chinese group JimChang Global on a 100 million-euro hotel and luxury housing development, also resigned his public post over the scam.

Invest Cyprus, the government agency tasked with attracting foreign investment and which signed the 2018 MoU with VeChain, plays a central role in bringing Chinese money into the country.

When Invest Cyprus facilitated the arrival in 2018 of Macau-based conglomerate Melco for the development of a casino mega resort worth $667 million in Limassol, the agency’s CEO, George Campanellas, became a member of the management team overseeing the project.

Melco CEO Lawrence Ho is a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, CPPCC, an advisory body to China’s central government.

Melco is also linked to the Cypriot telecom company Cablenet via the latter’s owner, Cyprus-based CNS Group, which is the parent company of The Cyprus Phassouri (Zakaki) Limited, Melco’s partner in the Integrated Casino Resorts Cyprus Consortium behind the Limassol casino development, City of Dreams Mediterranean. The resort is expected to open in 2022.

In 2019, Melco’s Ho attended the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing with Melis Shiacolas, the managing director of CNS Group and a relative of Cablenet non-executive chairman and 37 per cent owner, Nicos Shiacolas.

The Invest Cyprus board also includes Pantelis Leptos, a prominent property developer whose law firm, Leptos Group, handled the paperwork for 169 applications to the golden passport scheme between 2013 and 2019, according to interior ministry data reported by Cypriot media group Dialogos. The company also has an office in China.

A senior official at Invest Cyprus initially agreed to be interviewed for this story but then said he needed to seek authorisation to speak to the media. He subsequently did not respond to repeated efforts to arrange a meeting.

In Paphos, on the southwest coast of Cyprus, the head of the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Andreas Demetriades, signed a memorandum of cooperation in 2017 with the Hi Tech District and Chamber of Commerce of the eastern Chinese city of Changzhou, near Shanghai, for the development of a pharmaceutical tech park in Paphos, with tech parks – industrial zones specialising in science and technology – high on the agenda of Invest Cyprus and the government.

Demetriades’ law firm, Andreas Demetriades LLC, handled 272 golden passport applications between 2013 and 2019, more than any other firm.

Stelios Orphanides, an investigative journalist with the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, OCCRP, said China could come to dominate the telecommunications sector “because there is the lowest level of scrutiny in terms of risk management.”

“Cyprus doesn’t have the will to carry out thorough checks,” he told BIRN, “because those who manage the system – both the old elites and new elites, lawyers, accountants and so on – have learned to do just one thing, which is to prostitute the sovereignty of Cyprus in exchange for personal benefits.”

Reaffirming Freedom of Information in the Western Balkans after COVID-19

Montenegro adopted national legislation on the right of access to information while Albania improved the way citizens can track their FOI requests. Over numerous action plans, North Macedonia sought to improve FOI legislation, implementation and raise awareness. Serbia improved the amount and quality of information available on government websites, although attempts to reform the FOI law have hit obstacles in recent years. Croatian civil society noted that legal amendments, guidelines and trainings helped to increase the responsiveness of FOI officers while publishing a database on public authorities that are subject to FOI legislation was useful.

Despite having comparatively strong FOI laws according to the RTI Rating, these countries still face challenges in implementing the right of access to information to its fullest extent. The  COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the challenges in implementing these laws. 

Recently, BIRN found that access to information in the region worsened during the pandemic. For example, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia saw notable delays in response times to requests. Serbia even used its state of emergency to extend the time period for responding to access to information requests. 

While BIRN journalists submitted 359 FOI requests in 2020, authorities in the region approved only 173 (48%) of them, and partially approved 15 requests with only technical information. Authorities also said they would answer more queries once the state of emergency was lifted. Despite the state of emergency restrictions, Serbian and North Macedonian institutions were most likely to provide full answers to their requests (53% and 47% of requests received full answers respectively) but no requests from BIRN journalists in Albania or Bosnia and Herzegovina received full answers. Administrative silence remains a major issue for the region. Even after repeated follow-ups from journalists, 160 (45%) requests received no answers at all. In fact, 80% of the requests sent to authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not receive an answer.

Notable denials of information occured in North Macedonia such as where political parties did not disclose information about their election campaign costs. Serbian authorities used privacy exemptions to deny access to documents relating to cases against alleged and convicted war criminals. According to BIRN, the restrictive FOI law and the authorities’ reluctance to provide information means journalists in places like Montenegro often use their sources and other connections to get the documents they need.

Western Balkan countries could consider a number of actions to address these issues through their OGP action plans including:

  • Organizing comprehensive, ongoing and effective training on records management and implementing freedom of information laws. 
  • Proactively publishing all their decisions, records, spending and financial budgets free of charge. The data has to be available online, machine readable, and accessible for a broad audience. 
  • Issuing sanctions such as financial fines for officials that reject requests, or who do not respond to requests within legal timeframes without proper justification. 
  • Creating more opportunities for citizens to use published information, develop monitoring systems and provide feedback to citizens.
  • Where amendments to FOI laws in Western Balkan countries – such as Montenegro and Serbia – are proposed, they should ensure that the scope of publicly available information is made wider, that exceptions to access are narrowed, and that the process of making requests is made easier. They should not complicate access or legalise poor practice. 

This year, OGP marks its tenth anniversary and OGP members have been encouraged to co-create ambitious commitments. As most Western Balkan countries will be co-creating their next OGP action plan, this year marks a unique opportunity to turn the needle for enhanced access to information. Whether it be working with civil society to strengthen legislative frameworks, or ensuring the effective implementation of progressive FOI legislation, the Western Balkans can reaffirm their commitment to the essential tools of open government.

Sacked Index Journalists Make History in Hungary

Veronika Munk sits in front of her computer in a somewhat rundown apartment-office in Budapest. She frowns as she reads the text in front of her, but in general she looks satisfied. Munk and her colleagues at Telex have achieved what few people in Hungary thought possible: they managed to build a completely new media outlet from scratch in 10 months mostly financed by readers, defying the hostile media environment that exists in Hungary.

On July 24 last year, Munk and her colleagues made international headlines when they staged a dramatic collective walk-out from Hungary’s then-leading independent news site Index. “All of a sudden, instead of writing the news, we had become the news,” she tells BIRN.

About 90 of the Index journalists resigned en masse following the sacking of editor-in-chief Szabolcs Dull. In the lead-up to his dismissal, Dull had been warning that the independence of the editorial team was in danger and he moved the “freedom barometer” on the homepage of Index to “in danger”.

The journalist resignations made the news around the world and thousands of people took to the streets of Budapest to demand a free press and a ‘new Index’.

“It was a critical situation, and I tried to keep a cool head,” says Munk, who was Index’s deputy editor-in-chief and now leads Telex as co-editor. “I felt responsible for the team and all I knew was that we wanted to stay together. But on the other hand, I remember I felt an immense sadness and weariness – I didn’t even go to the demos because I was so tired.”

Munk has been a journalist all her adult life. She was at Index for 18 years, working her way up from intern to deputy editor-in-chief, and witnessed how the ruling Fidesz party has gradually assumed control over the bastions of Hungary’s independent press since it came to power in 2010.

Using a mix of restrictive media laws and deep-pocketed friendly oligarchs, the party has seized control of major television and radio stations, news portals, and print media publishers, to the point where independent analysis this year showed that Orban allies exert control over a majority of the country’s 88 most influential media outlets.

Index had fended off repeated attempts by government-allied oligarchs to influence its content. But after the municipal elections in 2019, when the Hungarian opposition scored some unexpected victories, most notably in Budapest, the Fidesz leadership reportedly decided to increase the pressure on Index, to mute critical voices ahead of the 2022 general election.

Index’s Achilles’ heel was its dependence on its sales house – responsible for advertisements and revenues – which was acquired in 2018 by businessmen close to the government, who started to apply pressure on the editorial department.

A year ago, Munk told BIRN that, “it was not the classical censorship on the content that we encountered, but a constant pressure on changing our editorial structure.”

The collective resignation was a desperate cry for help; and the project to set up a new outlet was a race against time. “It was clear from the very beginning that we had to react fast. The pressure was strong both inside, from the colleagues, and outside, from society,” Szabolcs Dull, the other co-editor of Telex, tells BIRN.

Dull remembers that the gestures of solidarity from society at large were heart-warming. “In shops or in the market – wherever I went, people were constantly asking me about the ‘new Index’. Once I was sitting in a restaurant and somebody sent a bottle of wine over to show his support. But we were also aware the we cannot make an Index 2.0 – it should be something different.”

Veronika Munk and Szabolcs Dull, co-editors of Telex. Photo: János Bődey

A year in the making

Telex was launched in October and became an instant hit. After less than 10 months in operation, it boasts 600,000 unique users, and is now one of the media market leaders in Hungary. Out of the original Index staff, the founders have managed to employ 72 colleagues, the vast majority of whom are on full-time contracts.

Telex is financed mostly by its readers, with a smaller share of revenue coming from advertising. According to its latest “Transparency Report”, revenue from donations was 2.3 million euros to the end of April – the single biggest donor being Czech businessman Zdenek Bakala with 200,000 euros – and another 400,000 euros from advertising. Over 50,000 people support Telex, in most cases with small donations, which provides a sustainable basis, though the founders won’t rule out a subscription-based model in the longer run.

“What happened at Index was truly a turning point for the Hungarian media landscape. People suddenly became aware that information and content is not free of charge: somebody has to pay the price: either it is the reader, the advertisers or political circles that must foot the bill. Here at Telex, we believe it is not absolutely necessary to make either political or business deals; we would much rather serve our readers’ interest,” Dull says.

Judging from the meteoric growth of its readership, Telex’s readers are happy with the new site so far. But politics is another matter. Telex journalists have become used to being ignored by government politicians for some time; the minister in charge of the cabinet, Antal Rogan, who also oversees government communications, once famously said he does not know what Telex is. It is not unusual for Fidesz politicians to refer to critical news sites as “blogs”, in a deliberate attempt to undermine their importance and credibility.

What happened at Index was truly a turning point for the Hungarian media landscape

– Szabolcs Dull, co-editor of Telex

When Telex reached around 400,000 readers, the government’s attitude changed markedly. “From the very beginning, we were sending questions to the ministries and to government politicians, but we rarely received any answer. This is, of course, nothing new for the critical media in Hungary,” Munk says.

“But now some Fidesz politicians are already talking to us, not from the first tier, but from the second; some even give us interviews. We also see they are closely monitoring what we publish,” she says.

‘Critical, curious and correct’

Telex’s tagline – “critical, curious and correct” – will remain the journalists’ guiding light even in the case of a change in government in Hungary next year.

Munk vehemently rejects the label of opposition or left-wing journalist. She says it is understandable that politicians are interested in framing the narrative in a way they find beneficial, but journalists should go after the news, and what’s interesting and important for their readers, regardless of political colours.

What makes the Index/Telex story special is the courage of these young people, Ilona Kocsi, president of the National Association of Hungarian Journalists (MÚOSZ), tells BIRN.

In most cases where the government took over or destroyed a critical media outlet, its journalists scattered, pursuing individual career paths. There have been some cases where a new independent outlet was established, though only with a handful of the original journalists. Telex was entirely different – this was the first time when an entire team resigned in protest, stayed together and proved that even in the current hostile media environment, an alternative, independent news site could be built.

“The decisive difference is that this was not a one-man show, but a collective action, with a community which had faith in itself and had even the courage to take on risks,” Kocsi says.

In broader terms, it could also indicate a generational change is in the air. Not everybody is ready to succumb to Fidesz’s bullying power; now there is an example of Fidesz’s dominance being challenged and fought off.

Slovenian Government ‘Eroding Media Freedom’, Report Warns

A new report published on Wednesday says that Slovenia, which takes over the rotating presidency of the EU on Friday, “has seen press freedom deteriorate ever since [Prime Minister Janez] Jansa returned to power in March 2020”.

“Since then, the ruling SDS [Slovenian Democratic] Party has embarked on a multipronged campaign to reshape the media landscape in favour of a pro-government narrative, renewing tactics successful during previous administrations and forging ahead with new forms of pressure,” said a press release for the report by Media Freedom Rapid Response, a group of press freedom organisations and journalism groups.

The report says said that the ruling party has been making “an aggressive attempt to seize greater control of the country’s public service broadcaster and national news agency using a mix of legal and administrative pressure”.

In late May, Slovenian journalists’ unions criticised the Culture Ministry after it revealed that several radio stations, well-known critical newspapers and investigative media outlets will no longer receive state funds.

These media outlets were defunded for their alleged “partiality”, but unions maintained that the Culture Ministry’s assessment was arbitrary. The Ministry insists the funding decisions were based on expert opinions.

The Media Freedom Rapid Response claims that at the same time, “propaganda media are being rewarded with lucrative state advertising contracts”.

Slovenia’s government also suspended financing for the Slovenian Press Agency, STA from the beginning of the year, alleging that the agency failed to deliver documents based on which it would be possible to determine a fair financing arrangement.

But some suspect that Jansa’s government is putting pressure on the STA to change its editorial policy by ‘weaponising’ the funding issue.

Slovenian media reported on Monday that the government has now asked its communications office to transfer a 845,000-euro advance to the STA for expected expenses.

Although the Media Freedom Rapid Response report welcomes the announcement, “serious concerns remain over the conditionality of this agreement and its detrimental effects on the independence of the agency”.

“We believe the government is only making this move because of the sustained criticism it has received for its actions and the need to remedy the situation before assuming the EU Presidency,” it says.

It also says that the Jansa government’s tactics “raise alarm as they reflect elements of the media capture strategy employed by Hungarian leader Viktor Orban”.

“Moreover, an influx of Hungarian capital linked to Orban’s Fidesz party is being used to prop up Slovenian pro-government media,” it adds.

A combative figure in the country, Jansa is known for his ‘Twitter wars’ against the media and individual journalists – and for his belief that he is fighting an entrenched left-leaning ‘deep state’.

An ally of Hungary’s authoritarian premier Orban, he has been accused of trying to take Slovenia down the same road.

Kosovo MPs to Consider Crucial Privacy Commissioner, Again

Three times Bujar Sadiku put himself forward for the post of commissioner at Kosovo’s Information and Privacy Agency, where he serves as director. Three times the recruitment process collapsed. When it was advertised in April for a fourth time, Sadiku stood aside.

“I have tried three times,” he said. 

The post of commissioner is vital to the implementation of laws regulating access to public documents and the protection of data privacy, but it has been vacant since 2019.

The first time it was up for grabs, the competition was scrapped after the British embassy, engaged by the government to improve transparency and keep politics out of public sector recruitment, said that none of the candidates was right for the job. Two subsequent attempts failed when lawmakers were unable to bridge their political differences to endorse a candidate. 

And ordinary Kosovars are paying the price. Without a commissioner, Kosovo’s Law on Access to Public Documents and Law on the Protection of Personal Data cannot be implemented, leaving individuals unprotected from violations of their personal data privacy and journalists unable to challenge institutions which refuse to release information of public importance.

“We have an institution that has been unable to function for more than two years,” said Mexhide Demolli, executive director of the NGO FOL Movement.

All eyes on ruling Vetevendosje


Albin Kurti. Photo: BIRN/Urim Krasniqi

With the power to levy fines against offenders, the commissioner should play a key role in improving transparency in the public sector and protecting members of the public against invasions of their data privacy. But experts say the Agency is already under heavy political interference and all parties have an interest in who takes the top job. 

Once again, MPs are currently interviewing candidates for the post, before a shortlist is submitted to a parliament vote.

But it will go ahead without the oversight of the British embassy, which pulled out in August last year after the collapse of the last recruitment process.

Flutura Kusari, an expert in media law who has monitored the recruitment process, said it was of great importance that lawmakers select someone with “integrity”.

“The Commissioner should be someone who has courage and who is independent because it is dangerous if this person is controlled by politicians,” Kusari told BIRN.

“Currently, the Agency is under political control; it does not act independently, numerous opinions it has issued violate international standards of freedom of expression.”

“The failure belongs to all political parties because they failed to find consensus,” she said. “But, so far, the blame should be on those parties which held power – PDK [Democratic Party of Kosovo] and LDK [Democratic League of Kosovo]. Now we have to wait and see what Vetevendosje will do,” Kusari said, referring to the current ruling party of Prime Minister Albin Kurti.

Meanwhile, the complaints are stacking up, said Demolli.

“We have many complaints from citizens whose personal data has been violated by different companies sending promotional messages to their phones,” she told BIRN. Without a commissioner, such companies escape sanction.


Illustration. Photo: BIRN/Urim Krasniqi

Journalists frustrated

The situation is also making life difficult for journalists, who have no one to turn to if institutions do not respond to or refuse requests for access to information.

“The most frequent manner in which requests for access to public documents are rejected by institutions is via silence,” said Kastriot Berisha, a member of the Kosovo Press Council, which gathers print and online media in Kosovo, and a journalist with BIRN Kosovo.

“Currently, we address complaints to the People’s Advocate, but he can’t force institutions to provide access to public documents, only facilitate it.”

Sadiku said the delays were damaging the Agency and costing the public.

“Many complaints are pending,” Sadiku told BIRN. “Each day the Agency remains without a commissioner implies delays in addressing the complaints. Many complaints could lose all meaning if they are not addressed in time.”

Open Calls for BIRN’s Reporters’ House

BIRN is advertising three positions, offering exciting opportunities to get involved in this unique new initiative.

Under the working name ‘Reporters’ House’, the museum and community space will be the first regional museum in the Balkans that tells the comprehensive story of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the wars that erupted as the unified state collapsed.

The museum space will offer a compelling, fact-based narrative but will not simply serve as a heritage venue of wartime history. We aim to create a contemporary, inviting, creative, inspiring and memorable place providing space for discussion, learning and growth.

We want to celebrate the journalists, photographers and media workers who courageously reported the war and its aftermath, exposing atrocities and serious human rights abuses while maintaining the highest professional standards despite the deadly risks they faced.

We want to highlight the untold or forgotten stories of solidarity, bravery and humanity in times of war, and to preserve the memory of the journalists who lost their lives in the Yugoslav wars. We also want to remember the darker moments for our profession, looking at how media were used for propaganda purposes, instigating hatred and division.

Many of the challenges that journalists faced during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have enduring lessons for media coverage of wars. At the same time, contemporary journalism faces issues of propaganda and disinformation that have been amplified by the online environment and social media.

This is why we also want Reporters’ House to serve as a community space for journalists to gather and discuss the critical issues facing the societies of South-East and Central Europe, exchanging ideas with experts from outside the region about the development of quality journalism and investigative reporting and the role of media in conflict and conflict prevention.

The space is located in Sarajevo, and will be renovated ahead of the planned opening in Spring 2022.

The opening date is symbolic as it will mark 30 years since the beginning of the siege of Sarajevo and the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which saw the largest number of media workers killed in Europe since World War II.

Sarajevo is also home to the regional office of BIRN, the first structured network of journalists from the former Yugoslavia who got together to report about the key issues that countries in the region were facing in the wake of the wars that accompanied the break-up of the country in which they were born.

The opening of the ‘Reporters’ House’ will also serve to celebrate the tenth anniversary of our regional Balkan Transitional Justice programme, a platform that ensures a regular, up-to-date flow of information about transitional justice issues in the region through our dedicated network of correspondents in all the countries of the former Yugoslavia and our contributors from other media outlets, civil society organisations, governmental institutions, academia, the cultural sphere and elsewhere.

Over the past ten years, we have reported from all the war crime trials that have been held domestically and internationally, we have revealed human rights abuses and help to locate war crimes suspects, and we have inspired and supported other journalists to report and collaborate on reporting projects about conflict-related topics.

We have also brought together various different interest groups to exchange views on transitional justice policies, and most importantly we have given a voice to thousands of war victims to tell their stories and demand justice. With the Reporters’ House in Sarajevo, we intend to take this work to another level and ensure that the issues and debates raised by the Yugoslav wars have a positive impact on the region’s future development.

We are now advertising three positions:

  1. Curator (Temporary); Deadline: May 15th
  2. Architect: Interior Museum Design; Deadline: May 25th
  3. Coordinator (Full-time); Deadline: May 15th

Terrifying Twitter: Slovenia’s Marshall Twito and his ‘Fake’ Friends

When a group of Slovenian researchers, rights advocates and investigative journalists teamed up last year to probe the activities of 27 suspicious Twitter accounts, one of them registered to Jordana Caric, ‘Joca’.

Caric, it turned out, was particularly popular with Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa, known to his critics as Marshall Twito, a nod to Josip Broz Tito, the man who ran socialist Yugoslavia for 35 years, and to Jansa’s fondness for Twitter as a means of conveying government policy and denouncing his opponents.

According to the study conducted by the institute ‘Danes je nov dan’ [Today is a New Day] and the investigative outlet ‘Pod crto’ [The Bottom Line], the “vast majority” of Caric’s Twitter posts were in praise of Jansa’s right-wing Slovenian Democratic Party, SDS, and scornful of its critics.

Between January and November last year, Jansa shared Caric’s tweets 30 times, despite the fact that, according to Danes je nov dan and Pod crto, Caric’s profile picture was lifted from a Brazilian Facebook user and the account, like the other 26, is almost certainly fake.

That the fake Caric account should enjoy such high-profile retweets is indicative of what Tadej Strok of Danes je nov dan says is the prevalence of so-called ‘astroturfing’ in Slovenia, a deceptive practice designed to create the impression of widespread grassroots support for, in this case, the SDS and the unpopularity of its opponents.

The 27 Twitter accounts – each of which used a stolen or computer-generated profile picture – “were involved in very extensive propaganda,” Strok told BIRN, “only promoting and publishing content that ideologically links to the ruling party.”

“Let’s say that the fake profile tweets something, a public figure retweets that without any critical distance… and then it is suddenly more important news and maybe it’s going to get reposted” in SDS-affiliated media.

Jansa might use the disclaimer ‘retweets are not endorsements’, but politicians like him “use fake profiles as a proxy,” said Strok, “to spread information or words that they know would put them in more trouble if they tweeted it themselves.”

“He retweets more than 100 tweets a day,” Strok said. “Of course they’re endorsements.”

Trump tactics


A mobile phone displays the suspended status of the Twitter account of former US President Donald J. Trump. Photo: EPA-EFE/MICHAEL REYNOLDS.

Marko Milosavljevic, a professor of journalism and media policy at the University of Ljubljana, says that, in a way, “Twitter has become the Official Gazette in Slovenia.”

The social media platform, used by roughly 100,000 of Slovenia’s two million people, shows “what the prime minister thinks, what he will do and what moves he will make, who are his enemies, what is his attitude towards different political actors,” Milosavljevic told BIRN.

And Jansa takes no prisoners.

In mid-March, five international media watchdogs wrote to the European Commission, the executive arm of the European Union, to warn of what they called Jansa’s “Trumpian style tactics” of attacking journalists on Twitter and dismissing critical reporting as “fake news”.

Sixty-two year-old Jansa, a fixture on the Slovenian political scene since independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, is currently involved in a defamation case stemming from a tweet he posted in 2016 calling two public television journalists “washed-up prostitutes”. He was given a three-month suspended prison sentence in November 2018 but a higher court ordered a retrial in 2019, which is ongoing.

Political analysts, public figures, protesters and those who challenge the government’s COVID-19 measures often find themselves the target of smear campaigns. And Jansa’s party colleagues get involved too, often with the help of fake profiles.

Danes je nov dan and Pod crto rolled out their findings in February and March this year. But it was only on February 22, when an SDS lawmaker called Alenka Jeraj inadvertently revealed her use of a fake Twitter account, that ‘astroturfing’ really hit the headlines in Slovenia.

Due to the word-limit on Twitter, Jeraj posted a comment in two parts, but posted the first under a fake account under the name ‘Kopriva’ and only the second part under her own name. Jeraj confirmed she had created the account and subsequently closed it.

It was the Kopriva scandal that prompted other media to report on the issue, said Anze Voh Bostic, an investigative journalist at Pod crto. Then came the attacks.

“What we analysed then happened to us,” Voh Bostic told BIRN. “First, attacks on Twitter, then an article in their media and then a few more tweets. It lasted maybe a week.”

Making hate speech acceptable


A street “exhibition” of PM Janez Jansa’s tweets entitled “Fits and Delusions of Marshal Twito”, launched by the Slovenian anti-govt protest movement in November, Ljubljana. Photo: Protestna ljudska skupscina.

Besides the 27 accounts deemed fake, Strok, Voh Bostic and their colleagues had also looked at online attacks against seven prominent individuals who had spoken out against Jansa’s government or his party.

They tracked down 307 accounts that participated in at least one of the attacks via tweet or retweet. Some of the accounts were most likely fake, while others belonged to senior members of the SDS, including Jansa. All of them followed at least six of the 27 fake accounts.

Such communication, from such prominent public figures, contributes to the normalisation of hate speech, said Voh Bostic, citing the example of the January 6 attack on the US Congress by supporters of then US President Donald Trump.

“In a way, Twitter is also to blame for the attack on Congress,” said Voh Bostic. “It gives some legitimacy to this kind of speech, that it’s normal.”

Voh Bostic said that one target of the attacks told him he had been harassed on the street.

“He was walking down the street and a couple of times they spat in his face,” he said. “It’s just a step away from being beaten.”

Voh Bostic said that, while the SDS, was the focus of their study, “it doesn’t mean that other parties do not use such practices”. But the ruling party is most visible and most aggressive.

According to Milosavljevic, the use of fake profiles cannot be attributed to a few over-enthusiastic party footsoldiers, but is “a systematic relationship in which many people are also paid” – the kind of system BIRN has reported previously on in Serbia.

An SDS spokesperson did not respond to a request for comment for this story.

The government’s communications office, UKOM, told BIRN that via social media it “highlights and draws attention to the problem of hate speech, distinguishing between hate speech and offensive and critical speech.”

It noted what it said were “calls for death” made during anti-government protests in 2020. Some protesters adopted the slogan ‘Smrt Jansizmu’, or Death to Jansism, a play on the Yugoslav Partisan motto ‘Smrt fasizmu, sloboda narodu’, meaning Death to fascism, freedom to the people. Critics of the government say the slogan calls for the death of Jansa’s politics, not of the man.

Alone with their phones


Slovenian Prime Minister and leader of the Slovenian Democratic Party, SDS, Janez Jansa. Photo: EPA-EFE/Szilard Koszticsak HUNGARY OUT

In March, Interior Minister Ales Hojs, a member of the co-ruling New Slovenia, NSi, dodged a question on public television about why politicians use fake Twitter profiles. Instead, he complained that the government is not given enough airtime on traditional media, particularly Radio-Television Slovenia.

“The fact is that the right side of the political scene has to use social media to attract people,” Hojs said.

Milosavljevic, however, said that, while politicians try to “behave nicely” in media appearances and press conference, they feel much more freedom on social networks.

“On Twitter, they are alone with their phones and then they write what first comes to their mind, even if it is very aggressive, vulgar, offensive,” he said. As Trump demonstrated, aggressive communication garners more attention on both Twitter and within society, and so “can be effective in that regard,” Milosavljevic told BIRN.

“Unfortunately, it’s also effective in dividing that society.”

Facebook Clamps Down on Iranian Dissident ‘Troll Farm’ In Albania

Facebook removed more than 300 Facebook and Instagram accounts belonging to members of an Iranian dissident group based in Albania that had been targeting Iran and content related to Iran.

“The network violated our policy against foreign interference which is coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign entity,” the social media giant said in its March report, “Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report”, which it published on Tuesday.

According to the report, the network now taken down was very active in 2017 and in the second half of 2020.

“The people behind this activity relied on a combination of authentic and fake accounts to post MEK-related content and comment on their own and other people’s posts, including those of international news organizations like Radio Liberty, Voice of America and BBC,” said the report.

The People’s Mujahedin of Iran, MEK, is an Iranian opposition group many of whose members moved to Albania in 2013 on the advice of the US. They live mainly in a camp on the outskirts of the capital Tirana.

Facebook added that it will continue to monitor any attempts to re-establish the network by people behind this campaign.

“The operation relied heavily on fake accounts to post and amplify its messages. Some of these accounts went through repeated name changes. Other accounts used the names of deceased members of MEK. Some claimed to be located in Iran but were operated from Albania. All the accounts were overt in their support of MEK and their criticism of the Iranian government,” the report continued.

Some of the fake accounts were a decade old but most of them were created between 2014 and 2016. They were particularly active in 2017, reduced activity in 2018–2019 and resumed in 2020.

Veteran Reporter Accuses Croatian Broadcaster of Revenge Sacking

The Croatian public broadcaster, HRT, confirmed on Tuesday that it had again sacked Hrvoje Zovko, a veteran reporter and president of the Croatian Journalists’ Association, HND, for violent behaviour in the workplace. Zovko did not receive an official notice terminating his employment.

“At this stage, we do not know what is written [in the termination notice]. He only received information about the decision from a journalist who called him and said he had been fired and asked for a statement,” his lawyer, Vanja Juric, told BIRN.

It was “quite clear that this is a continuation of [HRT’s] abuse against him that has been going on since 2018,” Juric continued.

HRT told HINA press agency that it had initiated dismissal procedures following “an anonymous report stating the inappropriate and unprofessional behaviour of Hrvoje Zovko towards one worker, a [woman] journalist, at work”.

Zovko on Tuesday denied all wrongdoing: “History repeats itself, not only through the fact that I continue to be abused by the same false accusations as three years ago but also in the fact that, like last time, the whole public was informed of my dismissal before I was.”

HRT sacked Zovko as a journalist and editor in September 2018, citing a “series of insults, misconduct, extremely inappropriate and unprofessional statements”.

It was referring to a quarrel between him and Katarina Perisa Cakarun, editor of HRT’s Information Media Service, which erupted after Zovko announced he would resign as executive editor of the HRT4 channel.

HND said then that it was convinced that the procedure and HRT’s decision would not have happened had Zovko not been the HND President.

Zovko had annoyed his bosses by speaking out about the state of media freedom in Croatia and alleging censorship at HRT. The broadcaster later sued Zovko for damages, seeking 33,300 euros in compensation.

HRT told BIRN on that occasion that it had to seek legal redress because Zovko and others “untruthfully claimed that there is censorship within HRT, though they know that none exists”.

After Zovko initiated a procedure against HRT following his 2018 dismissal, the Zagreb Municipal Labour Court ruled in 2019 that Zovko had been fired unlawfully. In August last year, the Rijeka County Court has upheld the 2019 ruling. In November last year, a court threw out a lawsuit ordering HRT to compensate Zovko for litigation costs of 2,580 euros.

Zovko returned to television after the court ruling, but now HRT has initiated a new procedure against him with similar accusations.

The Ministry of Culture and Media, commenting on his dismissal, said it condemned all forms of violence and abuse and advocated clearer procedures and equal treatment in all cases of suspected violence while adding that everyone must have the right to present a defence.

Zovko insists the accusations are untrue and that “from the behaviour of HRT, it is clear that it is not about the violations of my employment obligations, but about their desire for revenge”.

In January, the weekly Nacional published a story about the alleged sexual harassment of a journalist by the HRT Business Director – but HRT said it had checked the claims and “established that the allegations were unfounded”.

Both the HND and the Trade Union of Croatian Journalists, SNH, have said such investigations should be more serious. The SNH president and an HRT reporter, Maja Sever, said they had asked HRT to establish an anonymous reporting system that protects the victim – but the call was rejected.

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