Data Dominance: In Cyprus, a Chinese Outpost inside the EU

In October 2015, two years after a banking crisis left Cyprus in desperate need of new financing, President Nicos Anastasiades visited China on a charm offensive, touting the Mediterranean island’s low tax rates, its European Union membership and its readiness to take part in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, BRI.

The floodgates opened, but there was nothing sporadic about the Chinese outlay.

Today, money from Chinese state-owned or state-linked corporations has penetrated the core of just about every key Cypriot sector, from real estate to natural resources, transport to aviation, all in the name of a transcontinental infrastructure project linking countries along the route of the old Silk Road.

Thanks in part to the BRI, China is set to surpass the United States as the world’s leading economy by 2028 and become the standout superpower heading into the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution.’

A key component of the BRI is the Digital Silk Road, DSR, through which the Chinese Communist Party seeks to develop and export key technological infrastructure – including 5G – to participating states, boosting the importance and presence of Chinese tech companies around the world and, to a degree, replicating its digital authoritarian model.


Chinese investments in Cyprus. Illustration: BIRN/Igor Vujcic

In Cyprus, according to BIRN’s findings, China now dominates the 5G networks and the island’s wider tech ecosystem, creating a key Chinese outpost inside the EU with potentially far-reaching consequences for data security and the independence of Cypriot – and by extension EU – foreign policy.

It is a state of affairs that contradicts US and EU recommendations and the island’s own claims to be pursuing a multi-vendor strategy.

5G underpins power grids, transportation and water supplies, and, in the future, will enable military tools including artificial intelligence, said Carisa Nietsche, associate fellow for the Transatlantic Security Program at the Washington-based Centre for a New American Security.

“In extreme cases, analysts suspect China could pull the plug on the network, gather intelligence from data pulsing through the networks or cut off a 5G-enabled energy grid,” Nietsche told BIRN.

Chinese investment in Cyprus

In 2015, China’s largest private copper smelter, Yanggu Xiangguang Copper, bought a 22 per cent stake in Cyprus-registered copper mining company Atalaya Mining Plc for 96.2 million euros.

In November 2019, a consortium led by state-owned China Petroleum Pipeline Engineering signed a 290 million-euro deal with the Cypriot natural gas infrastructure company ETYFA to build a liquefied natural gas terminal for electricity generation. Among the four firms in the consortium is state-owned Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding, the top warship producer for the Chinese navy.

Before it pulled out in 2019, state-owned Aviation Industry Corp. of China, AVIC, was the largest shareholder in Cypriot airline Cobalt.

JimChang Global Group has invested 100 million euros in a five-star hotel and housing development near Ayia Napa via a joint venture announced in 2016 with Cyprus property group Giovani. The residential part was completed last year.

Macau-based Melco is investing $677 million in the City of Dreams Mediterranean, an ‘integrated casino resort’ in Limassol, Cyprus. It is expected to open in 2022.

Building 5G on Chinese foundations

Illustration: BIRN/Igor Vujcic

On his 2015 visit to China, Anastasiades, who was re-elected in 2018, visited the Shanghai research centre of Huawei, the world’s largest manufacturer of telecommunications equipment.

Huawei plays a key role in driving global industry standards in Beijing’s favour through the filing of patents that make the industry more likely to adopt Chinese proposals as global standards.

In terms of 5G standard essential patents, Huawei has the largest portfolio worldwide. The company claims to hold more commercial 5G contracts than any other telecom manufacturer in the world – 91. Forty-seven of these are in Europe.

At the research centre, Anastasiades lauded Huawei’s “important contributions to communications network construction in Cyprus” and called for “deeper ties”.

Huawei’s dominance, however, has unsettled the United States and others, which say the company’s equipment could be used by Beijing for spying, something Huawei has vigorously disputed.

In a rare interview with foreign media in 2019, Huawei founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei said: “I love my country. I support the Communist Party. But I will not do anything to harm the world.” He said that Beijing had never asked him or Huawei to share “improper information” about its partners and that he would “never harm the interest” of his customers.

Unconvinced, in October 2020 then US undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy and the environment, Keith Krach, visited Nicosia and, with the 5G licence application process underway in Cyprus, incorporated the island into the US ‘Clean Network’ on 5G, an initiative launched under former President Donald Trump to build a global alliance excluding technology that Washington says can be manipulated by the Chinese Communist Party.

The Americans are concerned, in part, by the proximity of Chinese-dominated 5G networks to military bases. But while on paper the Cypriots may have sided with the Americans, in practice Huawei is still very much in play.

Huawei (Nicosia)-the building in which Huawei’s main Cyprus offices reside. Photo: BIRN

The company entered the local market in 2009, taking a lead role in the upgrade of the island’s information and communications technology and the 2/3/4G infrastructure of its four telecommunications companies, CyTA, Epic, Cablenet and Primetel.

Since Cyprus uses the so-called Non-Standalone, or NSA, mode for 5G – effectively building on top of its existing 4G infrastructure – and with Huawei providing the components for 100 per cent of the telecom companies’ 4G Radio Access Network, RAN – the Chinese giant looked perfectly placed last year to take the lead in the 5G rollout as well.

The RAN is comprised of various facilities such as cell towers and masts that connect users and devices to the Core Network, which in turn encompasses all 5G data exchanges such as authentication, security, session management and traffic aggregation across devices.

In December 2020, the two biggest 5G contracts were awarded to CyTA and Epic.

But both companies, sources say, are overwhelmingly dependent on Huawei for their Core Network and their RAN infrastructure.

Semi-governmental CyTA launched its 5G Network in January 2021, catering to 70 per cent of the population on launch and aiming for 98 per cent coverage by the start of 2022.

A senior CyTA manager told BIRN that 80 per cent of the company’s Core Network and 100 per cent of its RAN is covered by Huawei infrastructure. The remaining 20 per cent of its Core Network is provided by Swedish Ericsson.

“CyTA is a governmental company and comes up with tenders for the equipment, and Huawei has been a long-term provider of infrastructure and support and offers the best prices,” said the senior manager, who asked not to be named since he was not authorised to speak to media.

Asked about the makeup of its Core Network and RAN infrastructure, CyTA told BIRN: “We inform you that any information regarding the CyTA network is a trade secret and any disclosure of it is contrary to the commercial interests of CyTA and its partners (article 34 (2) Law 184 (I) / 2017).”

Huawei also accounts for 90 per cent of Epic’s Core Network infrastructure and 100 per cent of the RAN, said a senior manager at Epic, who also spoke on condition of anonymity.

Epic’s collaboration with Huawei dates to 2009, when the company, then named MTN, sealed a 20 million-euro contract with the Chinese firm to upgrade its network.

Now owned by Monaco Telecom, Epic went on to develop Cyprus’s first 4G LTE network, leveraging Huawei’s RAN solution, on which another Cypriot telecommunications firm, Primetel, also entered into an access-sharing agreement. In February 2019, shortly before its rebranding as Epic, MTN signed a deal with Huawei for the development of its 5G network.

An Epic spokesperson did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

Nietsche, of the Centre for a New American Security, told BIRN: “For 5G to deliver on its promises of faster speeds, it requires an immense amount of data to travel through the network. And that data is pushed closer and closer to the end user, or the edge of the network.”

“In Europe, some governments have distinguished between implementation of Huawei in the Core Network and the Radio Access Network, or edge of the network. These governments argue that you can essentially create a firewall between the core and edge of the network.”

“However, we should not make such a distinction. As 5G networks develop, more and more data is pushed toward the edge of the network, and it becomes harder to distinguish between the core and edge of the network.”

Chinese ‘fusion’


Huawei section of the Gulf Information Technology Exhibition (GITEX) Global 2021. Photo: EPA-EFE/ALI HAIDER

Using Huawei components within 5G infrastructure is not a direct violation of European Union guidelines, since the EU toolbox on 5G – a common set of guidelines laid out by the bloc to limit 5G cybersecurity risks – did not explicitly ban any specific company but left it to member states to decide which providers were ‘high-risk’.

Authorities in Cyprus have not as yet identified any provider as ‘high-risk’.

The October 2020 memorandum of understanding that saw Cyprus sign up to the US Clean Network “does not imply in an implicit or explicit way that Cyprus will move away from Huawei”, said the man who signed it, Deputy Minister for Research, Innovation and Digital Policy Kyriacos Kokkinos.

“What it says is that we will collaborate with US agencies and authorities so that we ensure that the security standards are respected in the infrastructure we deploy,” Kokkinos told BIRN.

EU guidelines, however, do stress caution over suppliers “subject to interference from a non-EU country”, warning that a member state’s network could be vulnerable if there was a “strong link between the supplier and a government of a third country.”

Huawei’s state ties are considerable.

Zhengfei, the company’s founder, was a former Deputy Regimental Chief of the People’s Liberation Army; reports say that a considerable number of Huawei employees are believed to have worked for the military; and some Huawei employees have collaborated on research projects with military personnel.

But it was legislation passed in China in 2017 that really raised eyebrows.

Article 7 of China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law requires any organisation to support, provide assistance and cooperate in “national intelligence work”. Even before that, Article 22 of the 2014 Counter-Espionage Law required any “relevant organisations and individuals” to “truthfully provide” information during any “counter-espionage investigation”.

China’s “military-civil fusion” – which calls for private sector assistance in the country’s military objectives – was inscribed as a strategic priority in the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution in October 2017.

Some European countries have already balked.

In October, Swedish telecom regulator PTS banned Huawei from supplying 5G equipment to Swedish mobile firms due to security concerns raised by Sweden’s SAP security service, a decision upheld by a Swedish court in June this year.

Huawei has repeatedly denied posing a security threat, while China threatened “all necessary measures” in response to the Swedish ban. Beijing also told France and Germany not to “discriminate” against the company.

In the United Kingdom, a firm US ally, the government set a cap of 35 per cent limit on Huawei’s involvement in 5G RAN. It also excluded Huawei from safety-related and safety critical networks and sensitive locations such as nuclear sites and military bases.

In Cyprus, Kokkinos would not be drawn on whether Cyprus might set a similar cap.

“I don’t want to make a statement that might be misleading that this is not something that might happen in the future,” he said. “But at the moment we do not exclude any vendor.”

Critics of the Chinese government say the stakes could not be higher.

Given how much states and societies will come to depend on fifth generation technology, its security poses an unprecedented challenge, with any potential ‘hack’ snowballing into a threat to national security.

As a host to British military bases and US spy stations at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, Cyprus is no ‘island’ when it comes to geostrategic importance. Some experts say the threat posed by Huawei’s political and military ties and its data dominance in Cyprus cannot be ignored.

“One day Cyprus has to choose a side,” said Chen Yonglin, a former Chinese consular official in Sydney, Australia, whose work included monitoring Chinese dissidents until he defected in 2005. “One day China will take off its mask and Cyprus won’t be able to stand in the middle.”

“Cyprus needs to be careful about handing over its sovereignty to China,” he told BIRN.

John Strand, director and founder of telecommunications consultancy firm Strand Consult, concurred:

“The China we have today is a different China than we had five years ago,” he said. “China is a country which is very aggressive to countries which basically have an opinion, or have citizens who have an opinion about what is going on in China, Hong Kong or Tibet, and other places.”

“We have seen that China is not only threatening countries which go against them or criticise them, they also punish countries,” he told BIRN.

“If the Internet broke down 10 to 15 years ago, society could move on, it was not an issue. Nowadays, everything in our society is built on top of IT solutions which are connected to each other through the Internet of Things.

Cyprus embraces Chinese blockchain

Huawei, however, is not the only cause of potential concern when it comes to Cyprus.

Another is VeChain, a Chinese state-backed blockchain platform that in November 2018 entered into a national partnership with Cyprus to assist the island in the development and implementation of blockchain solutions across a range of private and public sectors.

Mediterranean Hospital of Cyprus (Limassol),one of two Cypriot hospitals to partner with VeChain store vaccination records on the VeChainThor blockchain. Photo: BIRN

It is the only such state partnership VeChain has outside of China.

The platform, launched in 2015, is a favourite of the Chinese Communist Party, which has entrusted it with contracts in, among other areas, agriculture and telecoms.

In July 2018, after thousands of children were given faulty vaccines, the Chinese government called on VeChain to create a nationwide vaccine tracking solution with health data stored on the blockchain.

When VeChain presented its solution at the China International Import Expo in November 2018, President Xi Jinping was in attendance. Xi has declared blockchain a national priority, with VeChain a co-founder of the Belt and Road Initiative Blockchain Alliance that aims to develop blockchain along the route of the BRI.

In Cyprus, VeChain developed the E-HCert App, which records COVID-19 PCR and antibody test results on the VeChain Thor Blockchain and is being expanded to serve as a wallet for all medical records of Cypriot citizens and as a vaccination certificate.

The ‘V-Pass’, a vaccination certificate sealed in the VeChain Thor, is also in the pipeline for the general public.

Two of the island’s biggest private hospitals have also struck agreements with VeChain for it to host their medical records on its blockchain.

Christiana Aristidou, co-founder and vice-chair of the Cyprus Blockchain Association, said that all necessary measures had been put in place “to maintain the safety of health data.”

“Blockchain is very secure and VeChain intends to take the lead in this sector in Cyprus,” Aristidou told BIRN.

Asked about any risks to data security, the Cypriot Health Ministry replied: “The Ministry of Health does not use blockchain technology in public hospitals.”

Golden passports and a city of dreams

But while some experts voice deep concern over the extent of China’s data presence in Cyprus, domestic scrutiny appears lacking. One reason may by the stakes involved for a number of influential political and legal figures.

In August 2020, an undercover report by Al Jazeera exposed a scam at the heart of a Cypriot policy to provide citizenship to foreign nationals who invest two million euros in the island’s economy.

According to the report, a number of high-level Cypriot officials had abused the scheme to secure passports for several thousand foreigners who did not meet the legal requirements.

Passport control at the derelict former Nicosia International Airport in Nicosia, Cyprus. Photo: EPA/JAN RAKOCZY

An official investigation, published in June this year, said that 97 per cent of the 6,546 ‘golden’ passports issued between 2007 and August 2020 had been issued since Anastasiades took power in 2013.

More than half, or 3,609, were for family members of investors and executives of companies and who were granted citizenship without actually meeting the legal criteria.

Between 2017 and 2019, the Al Jazeera report found that 482 wealthy Chinese nationals applied for passports via the scheme, more than any other nationality bar Russian. They include several members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, an advisory body to the Communist Party.

The chief protagonist in the Al Jazeera exposé was Dimitris Syllouris, who as speaker of the parliament at the time was the country’s second highest-ranking official after the president.

Syllouris was caught helping to fast-track a Cypriot passport for a fictitious Chinese businessman despite being told the applicant had a criminal record and was therefore barred from a ‘golden’ passport under the rules of the scheme.

Syllouris, who resigned over the scandal, had been a key player in a number of deals between Nicosia and Beijing, including in the tech sector.

Property developer and MP Christakis Giovanis, whose company partnered in 2016 with Chinese group JimChang Global on a 100 million-euro hotel and luxury housing development, also resigned his public post over the scam.

Invest Cyprus, the government agency tasked with attracting foreign investment and which signed the 2018 MoU with VeChain, plays a central role in bringing Chinese money into the country.

When Invest Cyprus facilitated the arrival in 2018 of Macau-based conglomerate Melco for the development of a casino mega resort worth $667 million in Limassol, the agency’s CEO, George Campanellas, became a member of the management team overseeing the project.

Melco CEO Lawrence Ho is a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, CPPCC, an advisory body to China’s central government.

Melco is also linked to the Cypriot telecom company Cablenet via the latter’s owner, Cyprus-based CNS Group, which is the parent company of The Cyprus Phassouri (Zakaki) Limited, Melco’s partner in the Integrated Casino Resorts Cyprus Consortium behind the Limassol casino development, City of Dreams Mediterranean. The resort is expected to open in 2022.

In 2019, Melco’s Ho attended the 2nd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing with Melis Shiacolas, the managing director of CNS Group and a relative of Cablenet non-executive chairman and 37 per cent owner, Nicos Shiacolas.

The Invest Cyprus board also includes Pantelis Leptos, a prominent property developer whose law firm, Leptos Group, handled the paperwork for 169 applications to the golden passport scheme between 2013 and 2019, according to interior ministry data reported by Cypriot media group Dialogos. The company also has an office in China.

A senior official at Invest Cyprus initially agreed to be interviewed for this story but then said he needed to seek authorisation to speak to the media. He subsequently did not respond to repeated efforts to arrange a meeting.

In Paphos, on the southwest coast of Cyprus, the head of the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Andreas Demetriades, signed a memorandum of cooperation in 2017 with the Hi Tech District and Chamber of Commerce of the eastern Chinese city of Changzhou, near Shanghai, for the development of a pharmaceutical tech park in Paphos, with tech parks – industrial zones specialising in science and technology – high on the agenda of Invest Cyprus and the government.

Demetriades’ law firm, Andreas Demetriades LLC, handled 272 golden passport applications between 2013 and 2019, more than any other firm.

Stelios Orphanides, an investigative journalist with the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, OCCRP, said China could come to dominate the telecommunications sector “because there is the lowest level of scrutiny in terms of risk management.”

“Cyprus doesn’t have the will to carry out thorough checks,” he told BIRN, “because those who manage the system – both the old elites and new elites, lawyers, accountants and so on – have learned to do just one thing, which is to prostitute the sovereignty of Cyprus in exchange for personal benefits.”

EU Observers Say Kosovo Voters Misled by ‘Opaque’ Facebook Pages

The EU Election Observation Mission said on Tuesday that non-transparent Facebook pages were responsible for “manipulative interference” in Sunday’s mayoral election run-off contests, spreading misinformation about rival parties and candidates, although the polls were well-organised.

“While candidates shared useful information through online platforms, opaque Facebook pages were used to spread misleading content hampering the voters’ ability to form opinions free from manipulative interference,” the Election Observation Mission said in a preliminary assessment of the conduct of the vote.

“Candidates generally used advertisements to promote their campaign platforms but third-party ads were largely used to discredit contestants, including with personal accusations,” the statement added.

The head of the mission, Lucas Mandl, who is member of the European Parliament, told media in Pristina that in general, the run-off elections were “well administered and competitive”.

“The campaign was vivid and peaceful, though its tone was harsher compared to the first round. However, in the absence of sanctions for campaigning outside of the official five-day period, most candidates were canvassing long before the official campaign kicked off,” Mandl said.

The preliminary statement also said that blatant lack of transparency related to the financing of contestants’ campaigns persisted in the second round.

“Perpetuating the low enforcement of campaign finance rules, the Kosovo Assembly is unable to guarantee timely audit of the disclosure reports and the CEC [Central Election Commission] did not sufficiently support the implementation of applicable regulations,” the statement said.

The EU mission said that in the absence of sanctions for campaigning outside of the official five-day period, “most candidates were canvassing long before the official campaign kicked off”.

“Candidate rallies were attended by leaders of the major parties, including by Prime Minister Albin Kurti and his ministers while LVV [ruling Vetevendosje party] candidates often portrayed themselves as the guarantors of projects financed from the central budget. Moreover, between the two rounds, the government announced a temporary increase of social benefits which led to opposition’s accusations of indirect vote buying,” it said.

Voters in 21 out of 38 municipalities went to the polls to elect new mayors in a run-off vote which was held four weeks after 17 mayors were elected in the first round.

The election result produced a disappointment for Vetevendosje, which won only four of the 12 municipalities in which it was competing, and lost in the capital Pristina.

Belgrade-backed Serb party Srpska Lista won the most number of municipalities (ten) followed by the Democratic Party of Kosovo (nine), the Democratic League of Kosovo (seven), the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (five) and the Social Democratic Initiative Nisma (one).

Reaffirming Freedom of Information in the Western Balkans after COVID-19

Montenegro adopted national legislation on the right of access to information while Albania improved the way citizens can track their FOI requests. Over numerous action plans, North Macedonia sought to improve FOI legislation, implementation and raise awareness. Serbia improved the amount and quality of information available on government websites, although attempts to reform the FOI law have hit obstacles in recent years. Croatian civil society noted that legal amendments, guidelines and trainings helped to increase the responsiveness of FOI officers while publishing a database on public authorities that are subject to FOI legislation was useful.

Despite having comparatively strong FOI laws according to the RTI Rating, these countries still face challenges in implementing the right of access to information to its fullest extent. The  COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the challenges in implementing these laws. 

Recently, BIRN found that access to information in the region worsened during the pandemic. For example, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia saw notable delays in response times to requests. Serbia even used its state of emergency to extend the time period for responding to access to information requests. 

While BIRN journalists submitted 359 FOI requests in 2020, authorities in the region approved only 173 (48%) of them, and partially approved 15 requests with only technical information. Authorities also said they would answer more queries once the state of emergency was lifted. Despite the state of emergency restrictions, Serbian and North Macedonian institutions were most likely to provide full answers to their requests (53% and 47% of requests received full answers respectively) but no requests from BIRN journalists in Albania or Bosnia and Herzegovina received full answers. Administrative silence remains a major issue for the region. Even after repeated follow-ups from journalists, 160 (45%) requests received no answers at all. In fact, 80% of the requests sent to authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not receive an answer.

Notable denials of information occured in North Macedonia such as where political parties did not disclose information about their election campaign costs. Serbian authorities used privacy exemptions to deny access to documents relating to cases against alleged and convicted war criminals. According to BIRN, the restrictive FOI law and the authorities’ reluctance to provide information means journalists in places like Montenegro often use their sources and other connections to get the documents they need.

Western Balkan countries could consider a number of actions to address these issues through their OGP action plans including:

  • Organizing comprehensive, ongoing and effective training on records management and implementing freedom of information laws. 
  • Proactively publishing all their decisions, records, spending and financial budgets free of charge. The data has to be available online, machine readable, and accessible for a broad audience. 
  • Issuing sanctions such as financial fines for officials that reject requests, or who do not respond to requests within legal timeframes without proper justification. 
  • Creating more opportunities for citizens to use published information, develop monitoring systems and provide feedback to citizens.
  • Where amendments to FOI laws in Western Balkan countries – such as Montenegro and Serbia – are proposed, they should ensure that the scope of publicly available information is made wider, that exceptions to access are narrowed, and that the process of making requests is made easier. They should not complicate access or legalise poor practice. 

This year, OGP marks its tenth anniversary and OGP members have been encouraged to co-create ambitious commitments. As most Western Balkan countries will be co-creating their next OGP action plan, this year marks a unique opportunity to turn the needle for enhanced access to information. Whether it be working with civil society to strengthen legislative frameworks, or ensuring the effective implementation of progressive FOI legislation, the Western Balkans can reaffirm their commitment to the essential tools of open government.

Twitter Labels Numerous Media Accounts in Serbia ‘State Affiliated’

Twitter has started to label accounts belonging to various pro-government media in Serbia as state-affiliated media.

Among those it deems affiliated with Serbia’s government are the dailies Srpski Telegraf, Kurir, Informer, Politika, and three free-to-air channels – Happy, Prva TV and B92, RTV Pink’s online portal, as well as the news agency Tanjug.

The label appears on the profile page of the Twitter account and on the Tweets sent by and shared from these accounts. Labels contain information about the country the account is affiliated with and whether it is operated by a government representative or is a state-affiliated media entity. 

These labels include a small icon of a flag to signal the account’s status as a government account and a podium for state-affiliated media. In the case of state-affiliated media entities, Twitter will not recommend or amplify accounts or their Tweets with these labels to people.

As noted in Twitter’s rules and regulations, Twitter defines state-affiliated media as “outlets where the state exercises control over editorial content through financial resources, direct or indirect political pressures, and/or control over production and distribution.”

None of the media affected has yet reacted publicly to the new rule.

Although the media in question are widely perceived as pro-government due to their highly positive reporting on the government and sharp criticism of the opposition, it is not clear what steps Twitter took to determine whether they fit the criteria. BIRN has asked Twitter about the methodology it used but has not received a reply by the time of publication.


The “Serbia state-affiliated media” label is visible on the pro-government media Twitter page. Photo: Screenshot/Twitter.com

Twitter announced it will start labelling state-affiliated accounts in August 2020, and a number of accounts linked to governments across the world have been labelled since then. However, Serbia is the first country in the Balkan region to be added to this list.

Serbia’s public broadcaster, Radio Television of Serbia, RTS, and Radio Television of Vojvodina, RTV, are among those whose accounts are also labelled state-affiliated. 

Twitter said it draws a distinction between state-affiliated broadcasters and those working more independently like the BBC.

“State-financed media organizations with editorial independence, like the BBC in the UK or NPR in the US for example, are not defined as state-affiliated media for the purposes of this policy,” it said.

​​Currently, besides Serbia, labels appear on relevant Twitter accounts from China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.

Last year, Twitter deleted 8,558 accounts engaged in “inauthentic coordinated activity” – some 43 million tweets criticising the Serbian opposition, independent media and individuals critical of president Aleksandar Vucic and his Progressive Party rule.

BIRN analysis showed that before it was removed, a network of accounts in the service of Serbia’s ruling Progressive Party found its way into the pages of pro-government tabloids, such as Informer and Kurir, disguised as the “voice of the people”.

Report: Montenegro Ruling Coalition Hired Offshore Company for Election

The head of the prominent Montenegrin watchdog MANS, Vanja Calovic Markovic, on Wednesday alleged that most political parties concealed part of their election funding sources and the actual costs of their campaigns for last year’s parliamentary elections.

At the promotion of MANS’ parliamentary election report, Calovic Markovic also said one of the parties in the now ruling For the Future of Montenegro coalition used an offshore company to make camaign videos.

“They hired an offshore company, Limanaki Studios LTD, from Cyprus, to produce videos. That company has not submitted financial reports since its establishment, and its owners are hidden,” Calovic Markovic said, not naming the actual party.

“The contract specifies the given company to do advertising videos for 50,000 euros, without the number of commercials or the deadline by when it must be completed, only the payment deadline,” she added.

In parliamentary elections held on August 30 last year, three opposition blocs won a slender majority of 41 of the 81 seats in parliament, ousting the long-ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, DPS.

New Prime Minister Zdravko Krivokaic led the largest bloc in the now ruling majority, the pro-Serbian For the Future of Montenegro, with the Democratic Front, DF, as its strongest member.

DF officials and the Prime Minister have not commented on the MANS report.

Calovic Markovic said that all the competing electoral lists spent a total of about 245,000 euros on advertising on social networks, almost ten times more than in the 2016 parliamentary elections.

“The administrators on social networks that financed the advertising of certain political structures were exclusively from Serbia,” Calovic Markovic noted.

In December 2020, in its report on the election, the OSCE/ODIHR mission said that Montenegro had not managed to ensure transparency, accountability and integrity of campaign finances, despite changes to electoral laws.

“There is general public mistrust in the campaign finance regulatory system, as currently implemented, and despite some improvements, the legal framework does not establish effective safeguards against corruption or circumvention of campaign finance rules,” the report said.

In its 2020 progress report on the country, the European Commission warned that the electoral legal framework remained largely unchanged since the parliamentary elections in 2016.

“While it provides basic regulations for the conduct of democratic elections, gaps and ambiguities allow for circumvention, particularly in campaign finance,” it observed.

Suspicions about secret camaign funds grew in January 2019, when a video clip from 2016 surfaced in which Dusko Knezevic, chairman of the Montenegro-based Atlas Group, appears to hand the then-mayor of Podgorica, Slavoljub Stijepovic, an envelope containing what Knezevic later said was $200,000 to fund election campaigns.

Knezevic, now believed to be in London, told the media he had been giving the DPS, led by President Milo Djukanovic, such sums for about 25 years, during which time the DPS had never been out of power.

In February 2019, the DPS was fined 20,000 euros and ordered to pay 47,500 euros to the state budget, while in February this year the Higher Court in Podgorica suspended criminal proceedings on Stijepovic.

Facebook Reveals Cost of Albanian Parties’ and Candidates’ Election Ads

Facebook has for the first time published a report on what Albanian parties have spent on online advertising on the social media giant during the current parliamentary election campaign.

According to the report, the biggest parties predictably spent more money in sponsored posts for political content than the others.

The biggest advertiser was the ruling Socialist Party, which so far posted 394 ads costing 21,907 US dollars, followed by the main opposition centre-right Democratic Party, which spent 11,536 dollars on 81 ads.

According to BIRN’s calculations, 123,152 dollars was spent on political and social advertising by the parties in all. However, its data show that only 113,252 dollars were actually spent by parties, candidates or sites that distribute political ads. The rest of the ads were from the media and from companies that have been wrongly categorized by Facebook’s algorithm.

Gent Progni a web developer, told BIRN that the total amount spent by each party on FB seems quite low for a target audience of two million people, but the figures change if every candidate or other Facebook page campaigning for a political party is counted.

“The amounts are small for an audience of two million Albanians, looked at from the official websites of the parties. But if you see each candidate in particular, or sites that have just opened and are campaigning for parties, we have a completely different reflection of the amount, which increases several times,” he told BIRN.

According to BIRN, many newly opened Facebook pages are spreading political advertising but their expenses, which are high, are not connected always to parties or political candidates.

Facebook asked Albania to be transparent with political advertising in March during the election campaign by including “paid for by…” in sponsored posts.

Political expert Afrim Krasniqi, head of the Albanian Institute of Political Studies, a think tank based in Tirana, told BIRN that this is the first time an Albanian election campaign is being held more virtually than physically.

“This is why parties and candidates are using social media as the cheapest and fastest source of communication,” he told BIRN.

He added that Albania lacks a strong regulatory legal basis or control mechanism concerning the finances of election campaigns or party propaganda on social media.

A law, “On Political Parties”, only obliges parties to be transparent about their financial resources, while the Central Election Commission is responsible for monitoring and auditing the finances of political parties.

Hungarian Media Expansion in Balkans Raises Worries but Lacks Impact

When Hungarian investors completed the purchase of the Slovenian state-controlled Planet TV for almost 5 million euros in October, it was the latest in a series of media takeovers in Slovenia and North Macedonia by Hungarian businessmen.

The Planet TV buyer, TV2 Média Csoport Zrt, was reportedly co-owned by Jozsef Vida, one of the wealthiest Hungarians, described as a member of the business circle around the ruling Hungarian party of Fidesz.

The Hungarian expansion started in 2017, when three companies from Budapest – Ridikul, Ripost and Modern Media Group – bought Slovenia’s Nova24TV. In 2018, Ripost and Modern Media Group left Nova24TV when two companies Hespereia and Okeanis became the new owners of their shares. Both companies were established on the same day in November 2018, by the same lawyer.

Among the owners of the Hungarian companies were Peter Schatz and Agnes Adamik, who later changed her name to Agnes Kovacs. They both previously worked for the Hungarian state broadcaster. Also involved was Arpad Habony, as a co-owner of Hungary’s Modern Media Group.

Ripost and Modern Media Group left Nova24TV when two companies Hespereia and Okeanis became the new owners of their shares. Both companies were established on the same day in November 2018, by the same lawyer. One of the companies, Hesperia, is owned by Agnes Kovacs. 

Nova24TV is co-owned by members of the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS), which is headed by the current premier, Janez Jansa, one of the main allies of Hungarian Prime Minister Orban in the EU. The investment was reportedly backed by Karoly Varga in 2016, a billionaire whose construction companies have been among the biggest winners of the public contracts handed out by the Hungarian government in recent years. 

Following that deal, Peter Schatz’s R-post-R acquired a majority share in Nova obzorja, the publisher of Demokracija, a political weekly co-owned by the SDS. 

 Macedonian charges made against Hungarians

Macedonian financial police have filed charges against Peter Schatz for tax evasion, BIRN has learned.

The financial police told BIRN Schatz made illegal gains for himself and his company CHS Invest Group, which is a majority owner of Alfa TV.
“[Schatz] did not report revenues in the total amount of 11,959,475 denars (around 190,000 euros),” the police said.

According to the police, Schatz damaged the budget of North Macedonia to the tune of around 19,000 euros.

The investigation into money laundering against Schatz is still ongoing. In August last year, the financial police asked the Public Prosecutor’s Office to freeze the money held by another Schatz company, Target Media Skopje, because of suspicion it was being used for the transfer of potentially dirty money from Slovenia and Hungary.

Despite those suspicions, and an official request, the money was not “frozen ”. “The legal entity Target Media is used only in order to transfer funds directly from foreign legal entities to Alfa TV,” the financial police said.

According to the police, the companies that were used for money transfers were Ripost Zaloznistvo from Ljubljana and Ripost Media in Hungary.

“[They] do not have any employees, their financing comes from sources of dubious origin, ie. there is a suspicion of a crime, abuse of official position and authority, and the funds transferred to the Republic of North Macedonia by these foreign entities are performed in order to conceal that they originate from a possible crime, using invoices for suspicious marketing services,” added the financial police.

Peter Schatz didn’t respond to BIRN’s request for comment.

Just as their media buying spree in Slovenia focused on outlets close to Jansa, Schatz’s and Adamik’s investments in North Macedonia have been aimed at those close to another of Orban’s political allies, the former prime minister Nikola Gruevski. 

Since 2017, Hungarian interests have taken over websites kurir.mk, denesen.mk and vistina.mk; First republika Dooel Skopje, which publishes the portal republika.mk; and the LD Press media Skopje, which publishes the portal netpress.com.mk. Hungarian interests also own the broadcaster Alfa TV.

The moves by these Hungarian investors who are close to the Fidesz party, which is hostile to independent media back home and has orchestrated the co-opting or killing off of critical media outlets there, has inevitably caused concern among some observers. 

Four members of the European Parliament – Kati Piri, Tanja Fajon, Tonino Picula and Andreas Schieder – submitted a list questions to the European Commission earlier this year about these Hungarian media investments and whether they represent Hungarian interference in the democratic process in the Balkans. 

On November 25, the European Parliament hosted a plenary debate, “Hungarian interference in the media in Slovenia and North Macedonia”, where Vera Jourova, vice-president of the European Commission, addressed those questions.

“Concerning North Macedonia,” Jourova said, “the Commission and the EU delegation are following the developments in the media sector in the country very closely. The Commission reports on these issues in its regular enlargement packages, including in its latest 2020 report on North Macedonia. This report assessed that greater transparency on media ownership and possible illegal media concentration is required.”

Kati Piri, a Hungarian-born Dutch politician and MEP, went further, claiming it was no surprise that Hungarian leaders, with Slovenian assistance, have put together an international interference operation that has poured millions of euros into pro-Jansa and pro-Gruevski media organisations. “[W]e all know very well that Orban’s outrageous propaganda efforts in North Macedonia and Slovenia are just the tip of the iceberg. Whether in Brussels, Ljubljana or in Skopje, Orban has only one goal: undermining the European Union for his own personal gain,” she stated.

Yet Balazs Hidveghi, an MEP for Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party, refuted this, arguing that these companies have invested capital in the media of other member states purely for profit, in line with one of the most basic principles of the EU – the free movement of capital. “The same is true for North Macedonia: investments are private business matters for media companies, and they have nothing to do with politics,” Hidveghi insisted.

Viktor Orban leaves after the second day of the European Council in Brussels, Belgium, in July 2020. Photo: EPA-EFE/JOHN THYS / POOL

The editor of the Hungarian-owned Demokracija magazine in Slovenia, Joze Biscak, backs this view, telling BIRN that Hungarian investors are “only here for the money”. 

Indeed, a BIRN investigation shows that while the competition struggles, Hungarian-owned media outlets in the region are flourishing. Their combined revenue in Slovenia and North Macedonia in 2018 was more than 10 million euros, according to data obtained by BIRN.

However, research commissioned by BIRN shows that the Hungarian investments are not having much of an impact. 

BIRN tasked the social media consultancy Bakamo with analysing the content engagement of Hungary-linked media in Slovenia and North Macedonia, and comparing it with other media. 

It found that the Hungary-linked media generate less engagement than their local counterparts on topics like the EU, Russia, China and Orban himself. The only two topics where the audience in North Macedonia engaged slightly more with Hungary-linked media outlets concerned stories related to migration and LGBT communities.

For three months, researchers at Bakamo observed content on websites linked to Hungarian-owned media outlets, identifying them as “Orban-media” (as opposed to “Non-Orban media”). The Orban-media included six Hungarian-owned media outlets in North Macedonia and three in Slovenia. In order to get a fuller picture, Bakamo included 18 additional news outlets in Slovenia founded and operated by SDS members that often share their content with the Hungarian-owned media outlets.

“Readers of Non-Orban media outlets аге more active on social media and engage with the content at а higher rate than Orban-media readers,” the analysis concluded.

According to the research, this means people in Slovenia and North Macedonia, as well as in Hungary, are less moved by what the media linked to Orban are telling them. “Higher engagement means that Non-Orban media articles receive more likes and shares on social media platforms,” the analysis said. 

It’s not for lack of trying, though. “Orban-media outlets produce a lot more content than Non-Orban ones. They act almost like spam in an attempt to build reach,” the research showed. 

The researchers focused on six key topics: migration, the EU, Russia, LGBT communities, China and Orban. On almost all topics, Orban-media outlets were underperforming in terms of driving a discourse, compared to media not linked to Orban.

The two topics where Orban-media outperformed their competition in North Macedonia were migration and LGBT. 

In Slovenia, on the other hand, while causing less engagement, Hungary-owned media outlets have produced much more heated conversations. “Orban-media readers are more emotionally charged,” the research concluded.

In the black

Viktor Orban (C) with Slovenia’s current Prime Minister and leader of the Slovenian Democratic Party, SDS, Janez Jansa (R), and SDS MEP, Milan Zver (R), attending a SDS campaign event in Celje, Slovenia, in May 2018. Photo: EPA

Despite the apparent lack of impact, Hungarian-owned media are still generating significant revenues. 

In 2018, according to available data, in North Macedonia, Hungarian-owned media companies posted revenues of more than 3 million euros, while in Slovenia that amount was around 7.3 million euros.

According to data from the Agency for Audio and Audiovisual Media Services, the profits of TV Alfa in 2017 were around 27,400 euros. In 2018, that had grown to almost 485,000 euros and in 2019 to almost 640,000 euros. The profits of TV Sitel – the most-watched station in North Macedonia – fell from 770,000 euros in 2017 to around 462,600 euros in 2019. 

The situation is similar with the Macedonian online portals that are owned by Hungarian investors: kurir.mk, denesen.mk and vistina.mk. The revenues of the parent company EM Media almost tripled in 2018 from 2017. 

The Hungarians also improved the financial results of Slovenian media companies. The revenues of NTV24 more than doubled from around 778,000 euros in 2017, to 1.76 million euros in 2019. By comparison, Planet TV, which at the time was still under Slovenian ownership with many more viewers than Nova24TV, made losses in the millions in 2018.

Similarly, revenues of Nova obzorja, the publisher of Demokracija, in 2018 reached their highest level in its 20-year history since Peter Schatz bought a majority stake in 2017. 

Joze Biscak, editor of Demokracija, told BIRN that those profits are the only thing that interests Hungarian investors. “If the balance sheets are in the black, they are happy. If they sink into the red, they are not,” Biscak stated.

He also defended his anti-immigration, anti-Muslim and anti-leftwing editorial decisions that create the heated discussions that Bakamo identified as merely a means “to sell magazines and clicks.” 

How to get ahead in advertising


The headquarters of the company which advertises olive oil in North Macedonia, Olivery Kft, in the Budapest suburb of Budaors. Photo: Anita Vorak

However, the sources of the money that keep those balance sheets in the black, at least in North Macedonia, remains questionable.

According to an earlier BIRN report, major advertisers in the Hungarian-owned media in North Macedonia included small Hungarian companies like Olivery, which sells olive oil; Bonyart, which sells home decorations; and Skin Delight, a cosmetics company. None of them actually sells anything in stores in North Macedonia.

The advertisement contracts that have resulted in the extraordinary financial gains in such a short period are now attracting the attention of the police in both Slovenia and North Macedonia. 

The Slovenian police confirmed that they opened an investigation into the financing of “certain media companies” in 2018. 

In addition, the previous Slovenian government appointed a special parliamentary commission to investigate allegations of suspected illegal Hungarian financing of SDS and illegal foreign financing of the SDS parliamentary election campaign in 2018. Those investigations were expected to bring some answers on how Hungarian money was being transferred to the Slovenian and Macedonian media, and how it was being used to finance the party-propaganda machinery. 

However, the new Slovenian government that took office in March – a coalition of Jansa’s SDS with the Modern Centre Party, New Slovenia and Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia – replaced the chairman of the parliamentary commission, which consequently hasn’t been particularly active this year. 

The Slovenian police confirmed to BIRN on November 23 that their investigation is ongoing, but said it could not comment further.

Turkey Fines Google For Violating Competition Rules

Turkey’s Competition Board has fined the US tech giant Google 196.6 million Turkish lira, equal to 21.8 million euros, after an investigation into the company concluded that it had violated fair competition rules with its advertising strategies.

“Google violated the terms of fair competition by using aggressive competition tactics,” the competition board said.

In effect, Google made it difficult for companies to show up in searches if it did not generate advertisement revenue for Google.

The tech firm defended itself on November 4 in a case which it was accused of “abusing its dominant power in the search engine market” to quash its rivals in the market with its advertisement strategies.

The Competition Board has also given Google six months to fulfil its requirements and end its unfair advertisement strategy.

Google will also have to deliver annual reports to the board about the advertisement strategy of its search engine for five years.

This is the second time that the Turkish Competition Board has fined Google. In September 2018, it was fined 98 million Turkish lira for violating fair competition law by prioritizing certain vendors over others in terms of advertisement space.

Google’s advertisement strategy has come under EU scrutiny as well.

In 2018, the European Commission fined Google 4.34 billion euros for violating European antitrust rules on online advertising following an earlier fine of 2.4 billion in 2017.

In March 2019 it received another fine of 1.5 billion euros for abusing its dominance to stop websites using brokers other than its own advertisement platform AdSense, bringing the total in EU fines to over 8 billion euros.

Google has a right to lodge an appeal against the judgment in the next 60 days.

COVID’s Toll on Digital Rights in Central and Southeastern Europe

The report presents an overview of the main violations of digital rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania and Serbia between January 31 and September 30, 2020, and makes a series of recommendations for authorities in order to curb such infringements during future social crises.

A first report, compiled by BIRN and which contained preliminary findings, showed a rise in digital rights violations in Central and Southeastern Europe during the pandemic, with over half of cases involving propaganda, disinformation or the publication of unverified information.

The global public health crisis triggered by the coronavirus exposed a new the failure of states around the world to provide a framework that would better balance the interests of safety and privacy. Instead, the report documents incidents of censorship, fake news, security breaches and concentration of information.

More than 200 pandemic-related violations tracked

At the onset of the pandemic, numerous violations of digital rights were observed – from violations of the privacy of persons in isolation to manipulation, dissemination of false information and Internet fraud.

BIRN and Share Foundation documented 221 violations in the context of COVID-19 during the eight-month monitoring period, the largest number coming during the initial peak of the pandemic in March and April – 67 and 79 respectively – before slowly declining.

The countries with the highest number of violations to date are Serbia, with 46, and Croatia, with 44.

The most common violation – accounting for roughly half of all cases – was manipulation in the digital environment caused by news sites that published unverified and inaccurate information, and by the circulating of incomplete and false data on social media.

This can be explained in large measure by the low level of media literacy in the countries of the region, where few people actually check the news and information provided to them, while the media themselves often publish unverified information.

The most common targets of digital rights violations were citizens and journalists. However, both of these groups were frequently also among the perpetrators.

Contact tracing apps: Useful or not?

The debate about the use of contact-tracing apps as a method of combating the spread of COVID-19 was one of the most important discussions in Croatia and North Macedonia.

At the very beginning of the pandemic, the Croatian government led by the conservative Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, proposed a change to the Electronic Communications Act under which, in extraordinary situations, the health minister would request from telecommunications companies the location data of users.

Similarly, Macedonian health authorities announced they were looking to use “all tools and means” to combat the virus, with North Macedonia among the first countries in the Western Balkans to launch a contact-tracing app on April 13.

Developed and donated to the Macedonian authorities by Skopje-based software company Nextsense, the StopKorona! app is based on Bluetooth distance measuring technology and stores data locally on users’ devices, while exchanging encrypted, anonymised data relevant to the infection spread for a limited period of 14 days. According to data privacy experts, the decentralised design guaranteed that data would be stored only on devices that run the app, unless they voluntarily submit that data to health authorities.

Croatia launched its own at the end of July, but by late August media reports said the Stop COVID-19 app had been downloaded by less than two per cent of mobile phone users in the country. The threshold for it to be effective is 60 per cent, the reports said.

Key worrying trends mapped

Illustration: Olivia Solis

Bosnia and Herzegovina saw a number of problems with personal data protection, free access to information and disinformation. In terms of disinformation, people were exposed to a variety of false and sometimes outlandish claims, including conspiracy theories about the origin of the coronavirus, its spread by plane and various miracle cures.

Conspiracy theories, like those blaming the spread of the virus on 5G mobile networks, flourished online in Croatia too. One person in Croatia destroyed their Wifi equipment, believing it was 5G.

In Hungary, fake news about COVID-19 arrived even before the virus itself, said journalist Akos Keller Alant, who monitored the digital environment in Hungary.

Several clickbait fake news sites published articles about COVID-19 victims a month before Hungary’s first confirmed case. The Anti-Cybercrime Unit of the Hungarian police arrested several people for spreading fake news, starting in early February when police raided the operators of a network of fake news sites.

In Kosovo, online media emerged as the biggest violators of digital rights by publishing unverified and false information as well as personal health information. Personal data rights were also violated by state institutions and public figures.

In Montenegro, the most worrying digital rights violations concerned privacy and personal data protection of those infected with the coronavirus or those forced to self-isolate.

The early days of the pandemic, when Montenegro was among the few countries that could claim to have kept a lid on the virus, was a rare moment of social and political consensus in the country about how to respond, said Tamara Milas of the Centre for Civic Education in Montenegro, an NGO.

The situation changed, however, when the government was accused of the gross violation of the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data.

Like its Western Balkan peers, North Macedonia was flooded with unverified information and claims shared online with regards the pandemic. Some of the most concerning cases included false claims about infected persons, causing a stir on social media.

In Romania, the government used state-of-emergency powers to shut down websites – including news and opinion sites – accused of spreading what authorities deemed fake news about the pandemic, according to BIRN correspondent Marcel Gascon, who monitors digital rights violations in Romania.

In Serbia, a prominent case concerned a breach of security in the country’s central COVID-19 database. For eight days, the login credentials for the database, Information System COVID-19, were publicly available on the website of a public health body.

In another incident, the initials, age, place-of-work and personal address of a person infected with the virus were posted on the official webpage of the municipality of Sid in western Serbia as well as on the town’s social media accounts.

In the report, BIRN and Share Foundation conclude that technology, especially in a time of crisis, should not be seen as the solution to complex issues, be that protection of health or upholding public order and safety. Rather, technology should be used to the benefit of citizens and in the interest of their rights and freedoms.

When intrusive technologies and regulations are put in place, it is hard to take a step back, particularly in societies with weak democratic institutions, the report states. Under such circumstances, the measures applied in one crisis for the protection of public health may one day be repurposed and used against other “social plagues”, ultimately leading to reduced human rights standards.

To read the full report click here. For individual cases, check our regional database, developed together with the SHARE Foundation.

Turkey Slaps €1m Fines on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube

Turkey on Wednesday imposed ten million Turkish lira (one million euro) fines on digital media giants including Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, Periscope and TikTok because they did not appoint official representatives in the country as required by a new digital media law adopted in July this year.

If appointed, the company’s representatives would have to remove any piece of content that the Turkish authorities consider illegal within 48 hours of an official request.

“As the deadline for social media companies… for informing the government about their representatives is over, ten million lira fines are imposed,” Deputy Transport Minister Omer Fatih Sayan said on Twitter.

Sayan called on the companies to appoint their representatives in Turkey immediately.

“Otherwise, other steps will be taken,” he warned.

According to the new digital media law, the online media giants now have 30 days to appoint their representatives. If they do not, 30 million lira (three million euro) fines will be imposed.

If they still do not comply within three months, they will face an advertisement ban for three months.

As final sanctions, their bandwidth will be halved and then cut by 90 per cent.

The government is also asking the online media giants to transfer their servers to Turkey.

So far, none of the major companies have complied.

Opposition parties and human rights groups see the new law as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s attempt to control media platforms and silence his critics.

The new regulations might result in these companies quitting the Turkish market, experts have warned.

PayPal quit the Turkish market in 2016 because of similar requests and Wikipedia was blocked in Turkey for more than two-and-a-half years.

Turkey has submitted the highest number of requests to Twitter to delete content and close accounts, the company has said.

According to Twitter, Turkey asked it to close nearly 9,000 accounts, but it only shut down 264 of them.

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