Tag: balkan insight

We are on the brink of a new era in artificial intelligence, so comprehension of the recent advancements in large language models, LLMs, is timely and much needed.

Previously dismissed as mere chatbots or simple predictive tools, LLMs have now proven their dynamic versatility and intellectual capabilities, contrasting to the simple text generation. Often, LLMs were viewed as devices predicting the following probable word based on the previous ones. However, their potential far exceeds this. LLMs’ advancements suggest these models could be forerunners to general artificial intelligence.

The power of LLMs is often compared to the human intellect, yet such a comparison cannot fully represent the true ability of these models. While AI does not possess sentiment or consciousness the way humans do, these models undertake cognitive tasks with a level of ability and proficiency that parallels human intelligence.

Digital Society Lab sought to delve deeper into the capabilities of large language models, specifically OpenAI’s ChatGPT-3. As the frontier of AI increasingly encroaches upon the faculties once considered exclusive to humans, there is a demand for a systematic understanding of these technological wonders.

Our study benchmarked ChatGPT-3 against objective and self-assessment cognitive and emotional intelligence measures. The results were surprising: ChatGPT-3 outperformed average humans in cognitive intelligence tests, demonstrating a solid grasp of using and presenting acquired knowledge. It matched humans in logical reasoning and emotional intelligence facets, painting a remarkable picture of AI capability.

Furthermore, ChatGPT-3’s self-perception in terms of cognitive and emotional intelligence turned out to be different from human normative responses. As humans overestimate themselves, ChatGPT-3 underestimates itself. This could be understood as a sign of self-awareness and subjectivity, hinting at a consciousness level.

In another of our inquiries, ChatGPT-3 consistently demonstrated a socially desirable personality profile, particularly leaning towards pro-social tendencies. However, the true nature of its responses remains uncertain, stemming from a conscious self-reflection process or driven by predetermined algorithms.

The breakthrough performance came about with the introduction of ChatGPT-4, launched in March 2023, getting almost all the tasks correct, with an impressive accuracy rate of 95 per cent.

Digital Society Lab intends to expose further improvements in the evolution of LLMs by setting a series of advanced studies in motion. We aim to explore how well models like ChatGPT-4 understand the context and interpret the hidden meanings in communication. Preliminary findings indicate an extremely promising potential in this domain, with AI possibly outperforming human understanding in linguistic pragmatics. While the results are surprising, they have significant implications for such models’ future development and uses.

Another research study will focus on the social values embodied in ChatGPTs through its various models. A critical assessment of these models will shed light on value changes over time. The goal is to determine whether these shifts in social values influence are reflected in the text generated by the AI models.

Potential to further polarize society

This holds profound implications for society. For instance, the AI nudging effect might guide an unsuspected shift of users’ social and political values, leaning them in particular directions. This could impact individuals, communities and even nations on a broader scale. Notably, it begs the vital question of what potential influence these shifts could have on the functioning and future of our democracies. Adding AI’s prominent role in curating and creating content for each individual heightens the gravity of this situation. Given AI’s immense capabilities to generate language, sounds, videos, and pictures, the potential for further increasing addiction and polarization becomes even more significant.

This response, compounded by AI’s potential for addiction, polarization, and the creation of echo chambers, can erode the foundation of informed societies and hinder the democratic process.

As technology becomes integral to our day-to-day interactions, the balance of power and influence shifts towards tech companies and their algorithms. This dynamic is amplified by novel developments such as the metaverse, which promises an environment potentially more addictive and immersive than our direct reality.

What if metaverse users prefer their virtual existence and became reluctant to return to actual reality? Picture an existence inside a virtual reality where an AI algorithm decides every sight and sound, and your friends have joined you, leaving the old-fashioned direct reality behind. Such possible future scenarios prompt a fundamental reconsideration of our interaction with technology.

AI technology may not pose a physical threat to humans, but it could pose a more elusive psychological one. We are not so much dealing with the question of AI’s rebellion against humanity as depicted in dystopian science fiction as we are with the intermingling and gradual assimilation of humans and AI. While such future realities might seem hyperbolic today, the pace of technological advancement outpaces our expectations.

No need for human journalists?

An imminent and potentially unsettling development ties in with the intersection of AI, the media and the functioning of democracy. Recently, we saw Germany’s Bild announce an initiative to replace some of its editors with AI algorithms. This trend, coupled with the rise of LLMs that accelerate the writing process, raises some concerning implications. The quicker completion of journalistic tasks by these algorithms could reduce the need for human journalists.

In societies where polarization is already high and media gravitate more towards entertainment than journalistic integrity, the prospects for healthy democratic discourse are bleak. Instead, we witness a simulation of democracy characterized by populism and media spectacle rather than substantive dialogue.

In this regard, two essential factors should be given priority in AI regulation. Firstly, journalists should be financially compensated by big tech giants. Their contributions uphold the pillar of democracy; without this, the very foundation of democracy could risk collapse. Secondly, algorithmic recommendations need algorithmic solutions. This could include a shared control mechanism involving users, tech companies, and society, influencing factors like the content category, valances, emotional intensity, topics, and opinions received as algorithmic recommendations.

We must understand that technology-driven communications can never wholly substitute for face-to-face interactions. At best, they are a simulation of human connection. Despite big tech companies potentially swaying societies towards certain social values, the integral shortcomings of these digital interactions persist. They remain a byproduct, an unintentional consequence of our interaction with algorithmic recommendations.

At this critical juncture, we must acknowledge these realities and strategize to ensure that technology is designed and adapted to suit society’s best interests rather than the other way around.

Ljubisa Bojic, PhD, is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, Serbia, and coordinator of Digital Society Lab.

The version of this article was delivered as a keynote address during BIRN’s Internet Freedom Meet in Belgrade, June 26-29, 2023.

Consumers of telecom companies in five Balkan countries and Moldova face challenges in making sure their rights to privacy are respected, new research by BIRN has concluded.

The challenges range from language barriers that disadvantage national minorities to a lack of transparency or clarity with regards company services and secrecy surrounding how and when telecoms providers share user data with public authorities.

Such shortcomings, the research warns, pose a significant risk to the privacy rights of consumers in the countries concerned – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Serbia and Moldova.

Applying methodology developed by Ranking Digital Rights, an independent research programme at the Washington-based New America policy think-tank, BIRN analysed the practices of the two biggest telecom companies in each country: Albtelecom and Vodafone Albania in Albania; BH Telecom and Telekom Srpske in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ipko and Vala in Kosovo; A1 and T-Mobile in North Macedonia; Moldcell and Orange Moldova in Moldova; and Telekom Srbija and Yettel in Serbia.

The research found that telecom companies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Moldova, and North Macedonia face a common challenge: language barriers and the comprehensibility of important documents outlining the rights and responsibilities of both the telecom company and the customer.

“… in some cases, the language used in these documents can be complex and difficult for users to understand,” the research paper states.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the BH Telecom Terms of Services document is written in complex, legalistic language that may be hard for many users to understand.

Despite their role in connecting people, in many cases telecom companies in these countries are falling short when it comes to non-majority communities.

In Kosovo, Vala’s Terms of Services are available in Albanian but not in Serbian, despite both being official languages of the country. Any non-Albanian speaker will have great difficulty understanding their rights and responsibilities as a Vala user.

Similarly in Moldova, both Moldcell and Orange Moldova provide their Terms of Services only in Romanian, while in North Macedonia, both T-Mobile Macedonia and A1 have their Terms of Services documents available in Macedonian and English but T-Mobile – unlike A1 which does have an Albanian version – does not provide an Albanian-language version. Roughly 25 per cent of the country’s population is ethnic Albanian and Albanian is one of the country’s official languages.

“This omission is especially important since it might exacerbate ethnic and national tensions in countries where such tensions already exist,” BIRN notes in its research.

The companies’ responses can be found in the full report.

‘Under the radar’

According to BIRN’s findings, none of the telecom companies analysed provides users with clear information about content or account restrictions. 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, BH Telekom does not disclose any information about content or account restrictions; Telekom Srpske’s policy is vague, with the company pledging to notify users of temporary restrictions in an appropriate manner and in the shortest possible time. It provides no detail on how or when notification will be made or the reasons for the restrictions. 

“In Serbia, Moldova, Albania and North Macedonia, telcos operate under the radar with little transparency regarding their content and account restrictions policies,” the report says. 

“These companies provide no information on the circumstances under which content may be restricted or accounts closed and offer no clear remedies or recourse for affected users.”

In Kosovo, privately-owned Ipko does not disclose any information about content or account restrictions, while publicly-owned Vala says that it can restrict a user’s account without prior notification. 

“This lack of transparency from telcos can be seen as a violation of users’ freedom of expression,” BIRN states. “It can also raise concerns about the adequacy and fairness of the restriction process, as customers may not be informed of the reasons behind the restriction or told how to challenge it.”

The findings also underscore the secrecy surrounding interactions between these telecoms companies and the state; the lack of transparency concerning the sharing of user information and data in the region is a cause of growing concern.

The report highlights a number of scandals and controversies involving telecoms providers in the region in recent years, including allegations of price manipulation by the three major firms in Albania, wiretapping accusations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, accusations of unfair competition in Kosovo, bribery and illegal wiretapping scandals in North Macedonia, violations of user privacy and wiretapping allegations in Moldova, and accusations of unfair competition and the illegal collection of user data during elections in Serbia.

“These incidents demonstrate the importance of vigilant oversight and strong regulatory frameworks to ensure that telecom companies operate transparently and ethically and protect consumers’ rights,” the research concludes.

In the past few years, online sexual violence has exploded in the Balkans. In North Macedonia, the most scandalous case was the case of “Public Room”, an online chat group on the encrypted application Telegram with over 7,000 members, where explicit photos, social media profiles, personal data and child pornography were shared without consent.

The group was shut down in 2020 but no one was formally punished. A year later, another such group appeared with the same name and purpose and on the same application, again with thousands of male members.

Appalled by the violence, hundreds expressed their revulsion and support for the victims through multiple protests.

The sheer size and nature of “Public Room” sparked huge reactions from the public. “Because the case had to do with child pornography and things that we want to turn a blind eye to, there was a bigger turnout for these topics,” Kalia Dimitrova, editor-in-chief of the Macedonian feminist platform Meduza, told BIRN.

In March 2022, the creator and administrator of the Telegram group were sentenced to four years in prison for the production and distribution of child pornography.

One 22-year-old member of “Public Room” was also indicted for the same crime, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office says that some other activities in the group are being investigated.

The Prosecutor’s office said it requested data from Telegram about the identities of users of “Public Room” but has not yet received an answer. Without this, it says, the Public Prosecutor cannot act.

Several protests against the online violence have been organised in Skopje. “Inaction is Complicity” the banner reads. Photo by BIRN

Laws changed but action lags behind

 As a result of public pressure over “Public Room”, changes to the criminal code were passed that introduced the new crime of “stalking”.

This crime anticipates a fine or imprisonment of up to three years for persons who follow or attempt to make unwanted contact with another person without authorization in the physical, but also in the digital, space.

This crime came into force in February this year and the Ministry of the Interior says that ten victims of the crime of “stalking” have been registered so far; in two of the ten cases, the crime was committed over the Internet. The Public Prosecutor’s Office says that only one charge has been filed for this crime.

A potential alleviating circumstance after “Public Room” is that victims no longer have to physically go to the police station to report the violence. This can now also be done online through the official email cybercrime@moi.gov.mk or on the online platform Red Button on the website of the Ministry of the Interior.

Although these changes have been welcomed, many believe that North Macedonia’s institutions remain sexist towards the victims. Dimitrova particularly emphasizes the importance of the police, because that is “the first point of the victims’ demand for justice and every second policeman is sexist or maybe a perpetrator of violence himself”.

Even when faced with an inadequate institutional response, activists continue to urge victims to report violence. But Dimitrova hesitates to back this advice, suggesting that there is a high probability that the victim will be judged and doubly victimized when seeking justice.

“We hope that micro-steps are taken and some institutional memory is created on how to deal with these cases in future. But it is sad that this ends up happening on the backs of the victims,” Dimitrova said.

Katerina Koteska, a lawyer from Bitola, also believes that victims often face condemnation, inappropriate questions and double victimization from institutions when seeking help. At the same time, Koteska says many obstacles also come in the form of prejudice by society at large.

Koteska represented a victim from the so called Bitola “Public Room” whose intimate screenshots from a video call were shared in a Facebook group. The victim was well known in the town and this was reflected in the court process itself. Hoping for greater understanding, Koteska wanted to hire a woman as the professional responsible for assessing the psychological state of the victim.

“However, she rejected my request on the grounds that she did not want to get involved in this case, as she would be gossiped about, and it would be something that would be heard around town. In other words, I think she didn’t want to get involved in such a scandal,” explained Koteska.

Natasha Boshkova, a lawyer from the Skopje-based human rights umbrella organisation called “Coalition Margins” expected a more responsible attitude from the institutions after working on a case related to “Public Room”, which was rejected by the Prosecutor’s Office after almost three years due to lack of evidence.

“I believe that this approach is harmful and contrary to the obligation of institutions to act with due care, i.e. to promptly and efficiently take everything within their jurisdiction to find the perpetrator, collect evidence and punish him, and to give the victims compensation for the damage they suffered,” Boškova told BIRN.

Kalia Dimitrova. Photo by Zarko Culic

Greater public awareness, but problem far from solved

Because of “Public Room”, online sexual harassment and violence have become more present in public discourse and awareness of this problem has increased among the public and institutions and, according to Dimitrova, among the victims themselves.

“Something very important happened, and that is the victims recognizing themselves as victims. [“Public Room”] gave more women and girls the opportunity, especially younger ones, to realize that some of the things that happen to them were normalized, and that, in fact, they are not normal and should not be.”

However, mere recognition of violence by the victims is not enough to eradicate the phenomenon. It is also important to change the behaviour of perpetrators, which is why experts believe that preventive measures and education of young people are needed.

Koteska says young people should know what intimate communication between two people is, and be aware that resending explicit photos is not only a breach of trust but also a crime punishable by law.

Dimitrova says North Macedonia’s institutions still do not realize that online and physical identities are practically equal, and still inadequately treat cases of online violence.

“As younger generations, we should insist in our efforts that there is no border between the real world and the digital world,” she said.

For Dimitrova, the problem lies not only in institutions but also in social values, as well the fact that aggression is often present in homes and at school. That is why violence is often perpetuated in all relationships – romantic, friendships and family – both during one’s youth but also later in life.

“When we talk about violence, it is externalized from reality and we approach those problems in a demagogic way. As a society, we need to face the fact that violence is a part of our lives, without exception, and we need to bring it down to that level,” Dimitrova concluded.

The mass shooting at the Vladislav Ribnikar Elementary School in Belgrade on May 3, in which ten pupils and one employee were killed, is one of the most tragic events in Serbia’s recent history.

While the parents of the children were waiting minute by minute for information about the fates of their own children and other children, the media began to publish unconfirmed information about the number of victims of the massacre.

The majority of the media clearly estimated that the public’s right to know the about the number of dead and injured, even unofficial and unverified, outweighed the interests of families and minors in protecting their rights to private and family life.

At the official press conference, several hours after the massacre, the Chief of the Belgrade Police presented the details of the pre-investigation procedure.

One of the first pieces of information from the judicial authorities was that no criminal charges could be brought against the perpetrator due to his young age.

To inform the public about the crime, the Chief of Belgrade Police took the initiative to disclose crucial details that would typically be presented in the criminal charge to the prosecutor if a criminal proceeding was able to take place.

He presented the public with a list of potential and planned victims of the minor perpetrator.

And while the public might feel that the media’s unofficial and inaccurate information represented a disturbance of the right to family life, in regards to the presentation of official information by the competent authorities, the red light of concern began to flicker, resonating within the hearts of the parents whose children attended Vladislav Ribnikar Primary School.

By publishing a list of potential and planned victims, those “potential targets” became actual targets of the media and internet bullies, which brought the already distraught children additional fear and pain.

And that brings us to the main question: Did the public have the right to know who the potential victims were?

Rights of minors should prevail over ‘right to know’

Ambulance cars stand ready at the site as police officers block a street near the Vladislav Ribnikar elementary school in Belgrade, Serbia, May 2023. Photo: EPA-EFE/ANDREJ CUKIC

The right to privacy and protection of minors are two main rights that collide with the right of the public to know, given that in this crime, both the perpetrator and the victims were minors.

Therefore, the answers to all questions should be sought in the regulations that protect the rights of minors.

Minors enjoy special protection: whether we speak about the perpetrator of a crime (whose data protection also protects the data of the victims in this case) or about the victims. Although before a criminal court in Serbia, the victims are deprived of most of their rights and are not the centre of the proceedings, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child mandates that child victims must be given special status, because any form of violence against children is deemed a violation of their right to life, survival, and development.

Hence, the Constitution of Serbia is the first line of protection for minors. Namely, although criminal proceedings are public (as a guarantor of the right to a fair trial), it is stipulated that the public can be excluded from all the proceedings conducted before the court or from part of the proceedings in order to protect the interests of minors or the privacy of the participants in the proceedings.

The interest of minors is an explicit reason for excluding the public from hearings in court by Serbian Criminal Procedure Code. A special Law on juvenile offenders and the criminal protection of minors upholds the mentioned constitutional right through detailed provisions and a specific institutional base.

Although this regulation applies to minors – older than 14 years – not specifically to children, logic dictates that children enjoy even more protection. Police powers towards minors are regulated by special police regulation.

On the other hand, the Law on Police stipulates the public nature of police work. The Ministry of Interior should regularly and fully inform the public about its work. But there are exceptions. The ministry cannot violate the regulation on data confidentiality and the dignity of citizens, or threaten the right to personal freedom and security.

The Law on public information and media regulates public information provided through the media. The specific rule is that minors must not be recognisable in the information that may harm their right or interest.

All these regulations and institutional guarantees uphold the golden rule that the protection of minors prevails over the public’s right to know.

Police should have known the ‘golden rule’

People leave flowers and light candles for the victims of a shooting in front of the ‘Vladislav Ribnikar’ elementary school in Belgrade, Serbia, May 2023. Photo: EPA-EFE/ANDREJ CUKIC

Who collected the personal data of the children? First of all, the data was obtained by police officers in the preliminary investigation procedure when exercising their powers regarding a criminal offence.

According to the Law on Data protection, processing of data carried out by competent authorities for the purposes of investigation and detection of criminal acts presents processing for special purpose. At the moment when they found out that the perpetrator was a child, special provisions of the Law on Police were activated for implementation: in such cases, a special police officer for minors acts, with special knowledge of children’s rights. That police officer had to have known the golden rule.

Who communicated the personal data of the children? The Chief of Belgrade Police, as official representative of the Ministry of Interior, showed the information to all media present in the live broadcast. In doing so, he said that while his actions were probably illegal, he did it for the sake of the public’s right to knowledge.

But in doing so, he committed a crime of “unauthorized collection of personal data” – the most serious one, as he acted in the name of Ministry of Interior. The role of prosecution in this case has to be more proactive. Such an obligation is stipulated by the special protocol on the actions of judicial authorities in the protection of minors from abuse and neglect.

In doing so, the Chief of Belgrade Police opened the possibility of a misdemeanor charge for illegal processing of data through the right to privacy was breached.

Who can be held responsible for these actions?

Apart from the criminal responsibility of the Chief of Belgrade Police, a misdemeanour charge can be brought against Minister of Interior, Bratislav Gasic. The minister is the one accountable for misdemeanour conduct within the ministry. The Data Protection Commissioner can initiate the procedure. Moreover, the Ministry of Interior is responsible for the nonpecuniary damage that minor victims and their families have suffered by these illegal acts.

Police chief opened a Pandora’s box

The Chief of Belgrade Police acted unlawfully, against the rights of children. With that, he unleashed Pandora’s box of targeted secondary victimization that spread through the Internet and social networks outside Serbia’s borders and beyond the reach of Serbian laws and authorities.

The Serbian public saw the Chief of Belgrade Police for the first time on television. A terrible event forced closed and captured institutions to open up and show all of their weakness and, above all, an incomprehension of human rights and boundaries that protect the right to private life, which, when crossed, threaten safety, security, and peace of mind.

These are the very values that the police should be safeguarding.

Katarina Golubovic is a Belgrade-based attorney at law specialised in the human rights field.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of BIRN.

Days after news broke of a major personal data leak in Turkey, the government has yet to comment. Lawyer Veysel Ok, whose Media and Law Studies Association, MLSA, exposed the leak, says the silence speaks volumes.

According to Ok, the personal data of nearly 100 million people – Turks and foreigners alike – who live or once lived in Turkey has been stolen and offered for sale online.

The data comes from e-Devlet [e-Government], the main public administration portal in Turkey and which holds a raft of data concerning the education background, health details, bank credentials and tax status of residents.

“This topic has been on the agenda of the country for four days, but the Interior Ministry hasn’t issued a single statement and we don’t know whether an investigation has been launched,” Ok told BIRN in an interview on Monday.

“If this happened in a European Union country, the minister would have resigned the same day. Unfortunately, the personal and private information of the citizens have now become public information and we still don’t know how that happened.”

Asked whether Turkey’s laws and regulations are up to the task of securing personal data and digital rights, Ok replied: “The current laws and regulations are more than enough but the government uses them to target journalists and not for the real purpose.”

Major defender of journalists

A 39-year-old lawyer and activist, Ok grew up in Diyarbakir in southeastern Turkey, the de-facto cultural capital of Turkey’s oppressed Kurdish population.

Ok said the context in which he grew up led him to become a human rights defender; he moved to Istanbul to study law and began working with rights groups and journalists.

He has spent the past 15 years defending journalists and has his work cut out in a country that under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has become one of the biggest jailers of journalists in the world.

Ok set up MLSA in 2017 after authorities began rounding up journalists and closing media outlets as part of a crackdown on dissent in the wake of a failed coup in mid-2016.

MLSA is now one of the most prominent defenders of journalists and freedom of speech in Turkey. Ok said that MLSA currently represents some 100 journalists pro bono and provides education and training to lawyers and journalists about their rights and freedoms.

The MLSA project Free Web Turkey, which monitors digital rights and censorship, first brought to the attention of the public the massive hack of the e-Devlet portal.

MLSA immediately shared the news and has filed criminal complaints against those responsible as well as the Interior Ministry, which is ultimately responsible for the security of the data.

Anyone who signs up to the site can view ID numbers, phone numbers and information about family members. More sensitive information – including full home addresses, real estate deeds, driving licences and education details – is available for a fee. Even Erdogan’s own data is on offer, as is that of main opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, BIRN found when it accessed the site.

The website originally identified is now inactive, but similar sites offering the same data have popped up.

Ok called the leak “very risky and dangerous” for the personal security of the public. “For instance, the addresses of women who are victims of domestic violence can be learnt by male perpetrators via this site, putting at risk these women’s lives and physical security,” he told BIRN.

Laws used to target journalists

Asked about Turkey’s readiness to secure digital rights and personal data, Ok offered the example of Deutsche Welle journalist Bulent Mumay, who this month was handed a suspended sentence of one year and eight months for publishing information about a construction company in defiance of a court order.

Mumay argued he was being punished for not submitting to censorship.

In Turkey, journalists are often targeted by courts. According to a report by the Progressive Journalists’ Association, in 2022 alone at least 174 court cases have been opened against journalists and media organisations and at least 40 journalists have been imprisoned or fined by the courts.

“The current laws and regulations on personal data protection are not effectively used for its original purpose but to target journalists,” Ok said.

“Unfortunately, this data is leaked and now available to everyone. Now we should learn how this data leaked and who is responsible. That’s why we have filed criminal complaints against the perpetrators and the Interior Ministry.”