Month: January 2023

Albania’s Prime Minister, Edi Rama, starts his workday at 8 a.m. on his Facebook page, posting photos or videos that foster an aura of optimism, often showing fragments of infrastructure projects from across the country.

Rama has turned his private Facebook page into the main communications channel between the government and the public; it has some 1.6 million likes and posts appear six or seven times a day. Each post gets hundreds of comments and thousands of likes.

Since 2013, the Prime Minister’s office has had another Facebook page, called Kryeministria. However, it’s a lot less popular, with just 3,500 followers, few interactions and no real public influence.

Rama is not the only member of the Albanian government to concentrate public communications in his private channels. Most of his ministers follow the same model; they have more followers and much more content on their personal pages than on the pages of the official institutions they lead.

Social media has been transformed over the last decade into a major political tool in elections; however, to be efficacious, they need to be fed continuously.

Data obtained through a Freedom of Information request also show that Prime Minister Rama and his ministers use public funds and resources and for this, alongside an extensive network of public employees, to produce content and promote their social media accounts.

By analyzing data collected by Crowdtangle, a tool developed by Facebook, BIRN discovered that the personal Facebook pages of Rama and his ministers are fed with far more posts, videos and lives than their institutional pages. About 98 per cent of the total interactions go to their personal pages, compared to just 2 per cent to their institutions’ pages.

The management of the digital communication channels of the Prime Minister, ministers, the Prime Minister’s office and the ministries is the responsibility of the Media and Information Agency, MIA, a body created amidst debate a year ago, which is led by his spokesperson, Endri Fuga.

Although the Socialist government’s communications through social media networks are not regulated by law, civil society groups accuse it of using public resources for political purposes.

“Ministers’ political profiles are supported by ad money from the state budget, while their official duties are later used as weapons to support their parties in election campaigns,” said Rigerls Xhemollari, from the Qëndresa Qytetare, an NGO.

Fuga, director of the MIA, told BIRN that the management of the content of the social media accounts of the Prime Minister and his ministers serves to inform the public. He dismisses suggestions that public resources are being misused.

“Employees of the MIA, including the spokespersons of the ministries, are engaged in producing content that is related only to the government duties of the Prime Minister and members of the government,” Fuga said.

“Their work serves the purpose of informing the public through the social networks about the government’s activities, not the personal or political-party activities of the ministers,” he added.

Private accounts much busier than public ones

Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama flashes a Victory gesture to the media as he casts his ballot at a polling station near Tirana, Albania, 25 June 2017. Albanians head to the polls on 25 June for parliamentary elections. EPA/MALTON DIBRA

The MIA was created in September last year through a decision of the Council of Ministers. It is responsible for providing transparency over the policies and activities of the Council of Ministers, ministries and any central government body.

The agency also produces government propaganda and manages and supplies the social networks of the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister’s Office, the ministers and their ministries with content.

MIA told BIRN in an answer to an FoI request that the content for the social networks of the Prime Minister and his office is the responsibility of four employees of the sector for informing the citizens, and is supported by the sector handling Design and Creative Product. The MIA did not divulge the number of employees engaged in this latter sector.

The MIA answer stated that the social network accounts of the members of the government and their ministries are managed by their spokespersons, supported by “structures responsible in each ministry”.

On Rama’s and his ministers’ pages on social media networks they often post personal statements or about their political or party activities, but the MIA insisted these are not their responsibility.

“The publication of posts of a personal character, such as opinions… are the responsibility of the Prime Minister or the ministers, while the publication of the activities or materials of political character and their publication on the social media accounts of the Prime Minister and the ministers are prepared and managed by their political staff, attached to the Socialist Party,” the MIA said.

The number of PR officers that work for the Prime Minister and ministers and their ministries is difficult to ascertain. However, a former ministerial adviser told BIRN on condition of anonymity that there are far more people engaged in this than the official numbers.

“Apart from the spokesperson, each minister has an advisor for media relations and three or four specialists that produce the content for social media,” he said, adding that part of the PR staff usually are paid formally for other positions not directly related to the job they actually do.

In the virtual world of the Facebook, the most popular social network in the country, the success of a page or profile is measured by the number of posts, shares or likes – which are counted as “interactions”.

Using data obtained through the Crowdtangle tool, BIRN discovered that the private pages of Rama and the ministers have an aggregate content and interactions that dwarf the activity of the official pages of the respective institutions. In this analysis, the private profile of Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Balluku is excluded, as she doesn’t have a page on Facebook.

Over a one-year period, the personal page of Rama and ministers together had some 8,801 posts while their official pages have some 5,342 posts. About 62 per cent of posts went to the private pages while 38 per cent to the official ones.

The private pages also had 53 per cent of the all videos posted on Facebook and 69 per cent of live transmissions.

However, the gulf is much wider when views or videos and interactions are also taken into account.

Data collected by using Crowdtangle shows that the private pages of Rama and the ministers together secured more than 15.2 million interactions during a one-year period, while their official pages had just 292,000 interactions. It means that some 98 per cent of the interactions went to the personal pages, compared to just 2 per cent to the official ones.

‘Historical memory ending up on mobile phones’

Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama speaks to media as he arrives for an EU-Western Balkans leaders’ meeting in Brussels, Belgium, 23 June 2022. The progress on EU integration and the challenges which the Western Balkans countries face in connection to the Russian invasion of Ukraine are topping the agenda when EU and Western Balkan leaders meet prior a European Council meeting. EPA-EFE/STEPHANIE LECOCQ

The normal practice of Western leaders in communicating through social networks involves a clear division between their personal pages and the official pages of the public institutions, which carry most of the burden in communicating with the wider public.

In Albania, the strategy of the government effectively favours the individual pages at the expense of the institutional ones.

Afrim Krasniqi, director of the Institute for Political Studies, criticizes the practice of publishing official acts on social networks, claiming it has effectively “personalized” the state.

Krasniqi says there is cause for concern over the consequences this might have for the documentation of the government’s work.

“Historical memory is ending up on mobile phones or on the personal emails of officials,” Krasniqi said, providing examples of when official conduct was never properly documented elsewhere, except on the personal social media pages of the Prime Minister.

“From a legal aspect, this is a violation of the law, while from an administrative aspect, this is a violation of the rules; from a political aspect, this is an abuse of public office while from a historical aspect this is an investment against the memory of the state and the archives,” Krasniqi said.

Xhemollari, from Qendresa Qytetare, told BIRN that channelling official communications via personal Facebook pages is a reflection of the general practice of the current government, which is based on the individual and not on the institution.

“This communication philosophy creates a party state, individuals that are stronger than institutions, while at the same time it violates the election law and the ethical codes on communication and erodes the rule of law and the transparency of governance,” he said.

However, not all believe in a complete separation between the political leaders and the institutions in terms of communications.

Erla Mehilli, a journalist and former spokesperson of former PM Sali Berisha, told BIRN that while social networks should not replace official channels through which the state communicates to citizens, personal pages can be useful in sharing some informal moments.

Mehilli believes officials cannot be banned from using their personal accounts for official communications, though she also believes that some form of regulation is needed.

“It is not easy to separate the individual from the office that he/she holds. I am not aware whether any law bans an official from using their personal pages along with the official ones for communicating, even for official communications,” she said.

MIA didn’t answer queries from BIRN about what happens with the ministers’ personal pages once they leave office, and have the possibility of using social media created at public expense for their future political careers.

Fuga said the content doesn’t change and is not deleted from these pages. “Such content continues to be accessible for the public in these pages beyond the time of the holding of the office by a minister,” he said.

Political figures targeted in many online spaces

The first half of September saw a flare-up of episodes linked to political motives in different countries.

Serbia, Hungary and North Macedonia are the countries where most such episodes were recorded. This only shows how divisive political clashes and rhetoric remain a major problem in the region.

On September 1, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and his sons received death threats via Instagram. A 47-year-old man from Zrenjanin was arrested on suspicion of committing the crime of endangering security in connection with the threats and was placed in pre-trial detention for 48 hours.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic attends a joint press conference with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (not pictured) in Belgrade, Serbia, 07 September 2022. Photo: EPA-EFE/ANDREJ CUKIC

In Hungary, a deceptive video aimed at an MEP started circulating on Facebook on September 6. A video of a band playing a concert in the Parliamentary Assembly building of the Council of Europe was leaked on Facebook in Hungarian falsely claiming to be showing EU politicians “celebrating their salaries” to “Jewish music” – as European citizens face record energy prices.

In another incident, on September 8, a photo supposedly of former Estonian president and activist Mikk Pärnits wearing a women’s pink dress started circulating on Facebook in Hungarian. The image is actually from a 2020 awards ceremony, where the winner wore a women’s dress to raise awareness about domestic violence and sexual abuse.

North Macedonia is the country where the largest number of episodes have occurred. A photomontage of ex-Finance Minister Nina Angelovska, depicturing her with a plate of cake in the shape of a penis, was published on Twitter on September 2. The author wrote: “Dear viewers, this one was a minister in the cabinet of the bonehead from Murtino.”  The “bonehead from Murtino” refers to former prime minister Zoran Zaev.

In North Macedonia, on September 5, a Twitter user posted a print screen of news about a press conference from the President, about the recent security session. Above the print screen, an inscription read: “It occurred to the louse to say that we are bankrupt!”.

Finally, a last incident on September 9 recorded by our monitors saw former PM Zaev being insulted on Facebook, in which Zaev was quoted about a potential referendum. Facebook users used threatening and offensive words about Zaev, such as “Smelly”, “Idiot”, “Shit traitor”, “Traitor soul”, and, “Crazy monster, the only option for you is a knife or a razor and be cut piece by piece.”

Minority and LGBT communities systematically attacked online

Following Serbia’s government ban of the EuroPride 2022 celebration in Belgrade, where right-wing anti-LGBT groups also announced they would march through the Serbian capital, police arrested more than 64 people, after thousands of LGBTQI+ activists turned out for the march, despite the ban.

At the same time, activists and supporters of the LGBT movement, along with various ethnic minorities, were subjected to an increasing number of online attacks on social networks.

A participant during the EuroPride march in Belgrade, Serbia, 17 September 2022. Photo: EPA-EFE/ANDREJ CUKIC

At the end of August, for example, Serbian filmmaker Stevan Filipović and actor Viktor Savić argued on social media about the holding of the EuroPride in Belgrade. The argument ended a friendship of almost 15 years. After the debate, Filipović shared threatening and insulting messages from Savić’s supporters on Instagram.

North Macedonia also saw anti-LGBT incidents. On September 5, a Twitter account posted: “You open your timeline, and what can you see? all the faggots jumping on your dick from early morning. Fuck off, I have romance to tweet about, fuck you, you ass- fucking tribe”. Other users also used similar insulting and threatening words.

Meanwhile, both the country’s Albanian and Roma communities were repeatedly attacked and abused in North Macedonia’s digital environment. Most incidents occurred on Twitter. One user on September 2, addressing the Albanian minority, wrote: “Shiptars, hippers, who don’t pay electricity, don’t pay, will some cheap electricity be able to boil beans for us on Friday?” The following day, another user on Twitter published a post with a picture of a parking ticket from City Mall in Skopje written only in Albanian. Above the picture he wrote: “Boycott Skopje City Mall, they only give receipts in ‘shiptar’ language”.

“Shiptar” is a highly insulting term for Albanians.

Between 16 and 18 September, three different episodes were also recorded on Twitter. First, while sharing a headline from a media outlet that refers to the appointment of ambassadors from North Macedonia, a Twitter user wrote: “Shiptars are messing with the whole country” and referred to “servants of the Shiptar mafia”.

Another Twitter user, referring to reports that the state administration will be filled with Albanians from the diaspora, wrote: “We’ve returned the shippers from the diaspora”. Finally, another Twitter account wrote an offensive post with hate speech towards Albanians, saying that he does not know any country “that loves Shiptars as a minority.

Data leaks, hacking attacks and online scams also recorded

Serbia, Romania, Bosnia, Hungary, and North Macedonia were all hit by cyber-fraud incidents in recent weeks. In fact, cyberattacks targeting IT systems in the whole region continue to endanger many institutional and private actors due to the absence of a prevention system and a political strategy for this purpose.

A source code on a computer in Taipei, Taiwan, 13 May 2017. Photo: EPA-EFE/RITCHIE B. TONGO

On September 4, personal data of more than 500,000 citizens collected since 2008, such as names, surnames, addresses, emails and dates of birth, from a Serbian employment website called Lako do posla were leaked online.

Initial analysis by cybersecurity experts said the data may have been extracted from the database using a security vulnerability on the website. Meanwhile, the Facebook page of the Bosnian online outlet Gracija was hacked last September 7. The announcement of the new edition of the online media was changed into vulgar and misogynistic words. Editors immediately removed the content. Gracija reported: “The cover could have been the reason for this incoherently written insult”. It said it would not censor its content, however, to show what “dirty games” take place during the pre-election period.

In Romania, several online attacks also occurred. A media website from Vaslui, a county on the border with Moldova, was the target of a Flooding/Denial of Service attack. The attacks don’t seem connected, as the IP addresses involved in the attack on the local media outlet were mostly from Asia, while G4Media was targeted through IP addresses mostly from the US. The local media website was left unavailable for more than an hour during the DDoS attack. At the same time, on September 8, G4Media, a Romanian online media known for investigative pieces on the judiciary, was the target of a massive Flooding/Denial of Service DDOS attack. The newsroom said the unknown attackers were likely targeting an investigative piece on a probe into how the judiciary system silenced plagiarism accusations against PM Nicolae Ciuca.

In Hungary, UniCredit Bank issued a warning that fraudsters are acting as buyers for a product advertised on the internet and asking for the sellers’ banking details (internet banking ID/password/banking activation code) by referring to a mail order service.

The information they obtain is then used to make unauthorised credit card purchases and transfers. Another hacking episode was recorded in North Macedonia, where the website of the Ministry of Education and Science was hacked by a Greek hacker group.

The attackers posted their text on the website: “Hacked by the Greek hacker team Netwatchers”. After the attack, the ministry insisted citizens’ data was not at risk.